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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation studies the supply and demand of capital goods, and the effects of investment tax 
incentives.  Business fixed investment is an engine of long-run economic growth, and plays a 
significant role in business-cycle fluctuations.  Each chapter brings together empirical evidence 
and quantitative equilibrium modeling techniques to examine a distinct aspect of investment. 
Chapter II examines the stimulus effects of investment tax incentives.  Investment tax 
incentives have changed dramatically over time with changes in the Investment Tax Credit, 
changes in the taxation of capital income and changes to tax depreciation provisions (e.g., “bonus” 
depreciation).  This chapter examines how the economy reacted to changes in investment tax 
subsidies in the post-war period.  Clear and consistent patterns can be seen despite substantial noise 
in the data.  Investment subsidies increase both purchases and domestic production of capital 
goods.  The evidence suggests that purchases rise somewhat more so investment subsidies also 
stimulate foreign capital goods producers.  Other measures of domestic capital production also 
respond as one would expect.  At capital producing firms, wages, measured productivity, 
employment, hours and material inputs all increase substantially following an investment tax 
subsidy.  In this chapter, we develop a multi-sector DSGE model capable of reproducing the 
observed patterns in the data.  The key parameters of the model are estimated and then used to 
make predictions on the aggregate effects of investment tax incentives.  In the estimated model, 
investment tax incentives are strong enough to cause noticeable changes in aggregate economic 
activity.  The import supply elasticity is considerable, allowing investment to rise even in the short-
run in response to investment subsidies.  The model also implies that there is only limited 
reallocation of labor across sectors. 
Chapter III introduces a new investment retiming friction in an equilibrium model of 
investment.  Conventional investment models predict that firms should sharply adjust the timing 
of their investment decisions to take advantage of predictable changes in the prices of capital 
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goods.  This extremely high intertemporal elasticity of substitution for investment has several 
implications: capital goods prices should be close to random walks; transitory shocks should have 
little impact on capital goods prices; and the distribution of capital holdings across firms should 
have no consequences for the equilibrium.  In this chapter, we develop an equilibrium model of 
investment with fixed costs at the micro-level.  In the model, firms face explicit costs of adjusting 
the timing of their capital investments.  In the benchmark case in which investment retiming costs 
are zero, the fixed cost model and the neoclassical model generate virtually identical aggregate 
predictions.  If the timing adjustment costs are positive, then capital goods prices may exhibit 
predictable changes over time.  Moreover, the distribution of capital across firms can have 
significant effects on the equilibrium.  We use the quantitative model to analyze the effects on 
investment of tax subsidies, transitory investment supply shocks, and an out-of-steady state 
distribution of capital vintages. 
Chapter IV studies the supply of capital goods.  Permanent investment supply shocks, 
corresponding to investment-specific technology change, are a central engine of long-run 
economic growth. In many models of investment, temporary investment supply shocks drive 
business-cycle fluctuations.  In this analysis, we focus on the supply of capital goods for 42 types 
of equipment and structures.  The data indicate that for equipment, the elasticity of investment 
supply is considerable, while for structures the elasticity of investment supply is close to unity. 
After calibrating the elasticity of investment supply, investment supply shocks are recovered for 
each capital type.  Using a mix of reduced-form and structural time-series techniques, the structural 
parameters of the permanent and transitory components for each series are estimated from the data.
3 
CHAPTER II 
STIMULUS EFFECTS OF INVESTMENT TAX INCENTIVES 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The neoclassical theory of investment demand implies that business investment should strongly 
respond to changes in the after-tax price of capital as the stock of capital adjusts.  In particular, 
investment demand should be highly sensitive to investment tax incentives like the Investment Tax 
Credit (ITC) and accelerated tax-depreciation allowances, both of which exhibited sharp changes 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s and both of which varied substantially across different types of 
capital goods.  In practice, however, it is not clear whether such subsidy changes have the large 
effects theory predicts.  Our objective is to examine the response of investment to changes in 
investment tax incentives and then to use these estimates together with a structural general 
equilibrium model to quantify the potential stimulus effects of such policies. 
We separately study the impact of tax subsidies on both investment purchases and 
investment production.  This distinction is important for a number of reasons.  Investment tax 
incentives have separate effects on current short-run economic activity and long-run capital 
accumulation.  This is particularly so in the present-day United States when many capital goods 
are imported.  Indeed, an investment tax incentive could cause sharp increases in purchases of 
capital goods but at the same time only mildly stimulate the production of new capital goods.  
Understanding these separate effects is central to assessing the effects of fiscal policy. 
 In addition to studying the differential changes in purchases and production of capital 
goods to investment tax incentives, we also ask how tax incentives influence the determinants of 
investment goods supply.  Specifically, we quantify the impact of investment tax subsidies on 
employment, materials costs, and the measured productivity of capital goods producers.  We also 
quantify the effect of investment tax incentives on the production of business structures. 
Available investment data suffer from severe measurement limitations and are inherently 
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volatile.  Despite these empirical challenges, clear and consistent patterns are evident in the data.  
For equipment types for which the data are reliable, our pooled estimates imply that a one percent 
investment tax incentive increases purchases of capital goods by between 1.00 and 2.00 percent.  
Domestic production of capital goods also increases though to a smaller extent.  Depending on the 
exact econometric specification, our pooled estimates indicate that equipment production rises by 
roughly 0.50–1.00 percent.  Thus, tax incentives “succeed” on both margins – they both encourage 
businesses to expand physical capital, and encourage increased domestic production, though the 
response of production is attenuated by about half relative to the increase in purchases 
The estimated increase in the domestic production of equipment is accompanied by 
corresponding increases in inputs and overall factor intensity at equipment producing firms.  
Following an investment tax subsidy, capital producing firms increase employment, total hours 
and wages.  Purchases of materials and energy inputs increase concurrently with the subsidy as 
does measured productivity suggesting that firms respond to the subsidy by varying unmeasured 
production inputs in addition to measured inputs. 
Importantly, we find very limited support for the conjecture that investment tax subsidies 
are passed-through to the pre-tax price of capital goods.  Although there are specifications in which 
a one percent subsidy leads to roughly a one percent increase in prices, such findings are not robust 
to even modest changes in the econometric specification.  Overall, the results suggest that either 
there are no discernible impacts of investment tax subsidies on prices or that true impact is difficult 
to measure accurately in the available data.  This result differs from Goolsbee’s (1998) finding that 
investment subsidies push up the prices of investment goods.  We replicate his findings using his 
sample period and vintage data, so we find that investment supply is more elastic than earlier data 
suggest. 
Finally, business structures also react sharply to investment subsidies.  For structures, there 
is no practical distinction between purchases and production.  Based on our estimates, for a one 
percent subsidy, production of business structures increases by between 1.00 and 4.00 percent.  
Unlike the equipment price estimates, which did not reflect any consistent price response to 
investment tax incentives, measured structures prices do appear to react to subsidies.  Our pooled 
estimates suggest that the reaction is between 0.50 and 1.50 percent, roughly in line with what 
neoclassical investment theory would predict. 
In the second part of this study, we use the reduced-form estimates to construct structural 
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estimates of a general equilibrium model of aggregate business investment.  Consistent with the 
estimates above, the model allows for a variety of real-world features including internal and 
external investment adjustment costs (Mussa 1977, Shapiro 1986a), variable capital utilization and 
a supply function for imported capital goods.  The estimated structural parameters indicate that the 
substitutability in labor supply across sectors is limited, effort in capital-producing firms responds 
to investment subsidies, and the import supply of equipment is fairly elastic. We use the model to 
study the general-equilibrium effects of investment subsidies.  Simulations of plausible investment 
tax policies indicate that investment and domestic production increase in response to a subsidy 
shock.  In the short-run, imports of equipment rise sharply and consumption briefly decreases 
relative to the steady state.  If the subsidy is permanent, investment, domestic production, 
equipment exports, consumption and GDP all increase in the long-run. 
2.2. RELATED LITERATURE 
Economists have attempted to quantitatively address the reaction of investment spending to 
changes in the after-tax price of capital goods at least since Hall and Jorgensen (1967).1  Our study 
adds to a resurgence of work addressing the effects of tax policy on investment.  This renewed 
interest in investment tax policy is driven in part by the availability of new data and in part by a 
renewed interest on the part of policy makers in the viability of investment incentives as a policy 
tool. 
Among the most well-known papers on this topic is Austan Goolsbee’s 1998 paper 
examining whether investment tax subsidies bid up the price of investment goods.  Goolsbee 
argues that the pre-tax price of investment typically increases following investment subsidies.  For 
many of the types of capital goods in his dataset, prices appear to rise almost one-for-one with the 
subsidy.  Goolsbee’s conclusion is natural – investment tax incentives might have little impact on 
investment spending because the supply of new capital is effectively price-inelastic.  This finding 
has been challenged by several recent papers including Whelan (1999), House and Shapiro (2008), 
Edgerton (2010), Mian and Sufi (2012) and Sallee (2011).  Whelan argues that after controlling 
for input cost shocks, there is little evidence that investment incentives bid up prices.  House and 
                                                          
1 The existing literature on investment demand and investment tax incentives is vast and an adequate summary is 
easily outside the scope of this study.  Foundational contributions include Jorgenson (1963), Abel (1981), Hayashi 
(1982), and Summers (1981). 
6 
Shapiro (2008) focus on the cross-sectional impact of bonus depreciation in the early 2000’s and 
conclude that, at least for that episode, there is no clear relationship between the subsidy and capital 
goods prices.  
There are also recent studies that suggest that real investment spending does react to 
subsidies and other shocks.  The estimated reactions to bonus depreciation in House and Shapiro 
(2008) were surprisingly large.  Edgerton (2010) argues that in the mid 2000’s, housing prices, 
farming prices and oil prices all experienced dramatic increases unrelated to the supply of capital 
goods.  He then looks at the production and pricing of construction equipment, agricultural 
equipment and mining equipment and finds little evidence that prices of these goods rose despite 
increases in the production of these capital goods.  Mian and Sufi (2012) find that the CARS 
program (better known as “Cash for Clunkers”) sharply increased automobile purchases while the 
subsidy was in place.  Zwick and Mahon (2014) use tax return data to re-examine the effects of 
bonus depreciation and find that investment responded strongly to the subsidy.  Zwick and Mahon 
pay particular attention to financially constrained firms.  They argue that these firms reacted most 
sharply to the bonus depreciation subsidy. 
In this study, we provide new evidence on the equilibrium effects of investment tax 
incentives.  We present reduced-form estimates using a dataset that allows us to analyze the 
responses of capital goods purchases, production, and measures of capital goods producer activity 
on a consistent basis.  We find that investment subsidies increase investment, but their effect on 
domestic production is more attenuated, indicating that subsidies “leak” to foreign producers 
through imports.  These conclusions are supported by simulations of tax policy in a multi-sector, 
open-economy model calibrated to match the reduced-form estimates. 
2.3. DATA AND CONCEPTS 
We use three primary datasets in the analysis.  Data on investment purchases come from nominal 
investment spending and investment prices in the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) 
underlying detail tables.  Our data on domestic production of equipment come from the NBER-
CES Manufacturing Productivity Database.  Each dataset forms a panel of investment quantities 
and prices by type.  Finally, our data on the investment tax credit and the tax depreciation treatment 
of investment by type are from Dale Jorgenson.  We match the BEA investment data to IRS 
depreciation schedules and investment tax credits.  We exclude types that do not have clear 
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matches to the IRS tax treatment.  The investment tax subsidy includes both investment tax credits 
(ITC) and the present discounted value of tax depreciation allowances. 
Investment Purchases.  Our data on investment purchases come from the BEA underlying detail 
tables.  We exclude computers and software because these categories exhibit extreme movements 
in prices and quantities and are notoriously difficult to measure.  After excluding computers, we 
have 28 separate equipment investment categories.  The underlying detail tables also provide data 
on structures investment by type.  We exclude residential investment from our analysis.  Our 
structures dataset includes 20 types of structures.  The BEA data are quarterly.  We confine our 
attention to the period 1959:1–2009:4, the period for which the NBER production and input data 
are available. 
For each type, the BEA provides a price index and a nominal measure of total purchases.  
We define real purchases of type m capital as the ratio of total nominal purchases to the type-
specific price index.  We define the pre-tax real relative price for type m capital as the ratio of the 
type-specific price index at date t to the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) deflator for 
nondurables at date t.Domestic Investment Production.  The data on the domestic production of 
investment goods by type come from the NBER Productivity Database.  This dataset was 
assembled by Eric Bartelsman, Randy Becker, Wayne Gray and Jordan Marvakov.2  The 
production data exist at a much more disaggregated level than the data in the BEA detail files.  
Product types are identified by six-digit NAICS codes.  The dataset includes nominal shipments, 
nominal product prices, employment, payroll, production worker wages and measured total factor 
productivity (TFP).  Unlike the BEA data, the data in the productivity dataset are at an annual 
frequency.  
To make the production data comparable with the BEA purchases data we aggregate groups 
of investment goods according to the categories in the BEA detail tables.  The BEA provided us 
with a mapping from the underlying census data in the Productivity Database to the more 
aggregated investment categories in the detail files.  Aggregate nominal production is simply the 
sum of the disaggregated nominal production.  The aggregate nominal price is a weighted average 
of type-specific prices with weights given by the share of nominal production.  With the aggregated 
                                                          
2 The raw data are freely available at the NBER data website.  For more information on the NBER Manufacturing 
Productivity Database see Bartelsman and Gray (1996).  
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investment types, we then create quarterly production series by distributing the annual aggregates 
using the Chow-Lin (1971) procedure.3  As above, real output is defined as the nominal level of 
shipments divided by the type specific price index, and the real relative price as the type-specific 
relative price divided by the PCE deflator. 
Unlike equipment, where the distinction between production and purchases is important, 
purchases of structures are treated as being identical to the production of structures. That is, we 
assume that there are no imports or exports of structures. 
Investment Tax Subsidies.  We consider three separate measures of investment tax subsidies.  The 
first is the investment tax credit (ITC) itself.  The ITC allows firms to reduce their taxable income 
by a given fraction of investment purchases.  The reduction typically occurs the year the asset was 
purchased, but can be carried forward under certain conditions.  Let mtITC  denote the ITC for type 
m capital at time t.  The ITC is a particularly salient form of investment tax incentive, so we 
consider it separately from the comprehensive measures of investment subsidies. 
The second measure is a comprehensive tax subsidy which includes both the ITC and the 
present discounted value of tax depreciation allowances.  Let mtz  denote the present discounted 
value of tax depreciation allowances for type m capital purchased at time t.  That is, if 1 ti  is the 
gross nominal interest rate and  , 1
Rm
j t j
D

 is a sequence of tax depreciation deductions for a unit of 
type m capital with a tax life of R periods, then 
 
 
,
1
1
0
1




mR
t jm
t j
j ss
D
z
i
  (1) 
The comprehensive subsidy mt  is then 
 
  1m m d mt t t t tITC z      (2) 
Here, the measure assumes that the firm writes off depreciation deductions against the corporate 
rate t
  and then distributes the profits to shareholders who pay a tax rate dt  on dividend earnings.  
The comprehensive subsidy can change for a variety of reasons.  Changes (or expected changes) 
                                                          
3 See Chow and Lin (1971). Our approach uses the BEA purchases data to distribute the annual production data over 
the quarters between observations. 
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in nominal interest rates, changes in depreciation schedules or changes in the corporate tax rate 
can all cause changes in mt .  In this way, the comprehensive subsidy is substantially less 
transparent than the simple ITC.  The dependence of the comprehensive subsidy on the corporate 
tax deserves special mention.  Notice that the value of the subsidy increases with t
  since the firm 
is writing off depreciation against the corporate income tax rate.  It is not necessarily true however, 
that an increase in t
  will lead to an increase in investment demand.  While the effective subsidy 
to new capital has gone up, the value of the capital itself may have gone down.  Our third measure 
of the subsidy deals with this dependence.   
If there were no change in the price of capital over time, the firms’ first order condition for 
capital implies that firms would invest to the point at which the marginal product of capital is equal 
to the user cost of capital.  In such a situation, the first order condition for type m capital would 
require 
      
,
1
,
1 1


 

  
 
m
tk m m
t t d
t t
MP p r   (3) 
where ,k mtMP  is the marginal product of type m capital and 
m
tp  is the real relative price of type m 
capital.  Our third measure of the subsidy, which we denote as the Jorgensonian tax term, reflects 
the impact of taxation on the user cost in equation (3).  The sign is reversed so that an increase in 
this measure corresponds to a positive subsidy.  More specifically, the Jorgernsonian tax term is 
 
 
  
 
  
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
m m d m
t t t t t
d d
t t t t
ITC z
 
  
   
   

   
. (4) 
Unlike under the comprehensive subsidy (2), under the Jorgensonian tax term (4) an increase in 
the corporate profit tax t
  reduces the firm’s incentives to accumulate capital.  While it enhances 
the value of the tax subsidy (through the effect on mtz ) it reduces the value of the after-tax marginal 
product by more. 
The investment tax subsidy includes both investment tax credits and the present discounted 
value of tax depreciation allowances.  The original annual data on the ITC and the discounted 
value of depreciation deductions are available from Jorgenson and Yun (1991).4  To match our 
                                                          
4 We are grateful to Dale Jorgenson and Jon Samuel for providing updates to these data.   
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data on investment and investment prices, we construct a quarterly version of these data using the 
historical record of investment tax changes, some of which have effective dates that do not 
correspond to calendar years.  Our quarterly estimates of subsidy variables are available as an 
online appendix. 
Figure 2.1 plots measured purchases, production, prices and the investment subsidy for 
general equipment (one of the 40 investment categories in our equipment dataset).  The top panel 
shows purchases and production and the lower panel shows the real relative price.  The figure 
illustrates three noteworthy features common to most investment types in our sample.  
First, the quantity series exhibit dramatic movements over time.  Real quantities (for either 
purchases or production) regularly change by more than twenty percent from one year to the next.  
In contrast, real relative prices are much less volatile.  The average volatility of investment 
purchases and production is 11 and 8 percent respectively.  In contrast, the average volatility of 
investment prices is only two percent.  Edgerton (2010) argues that, on its face, this observation 
by itself suggests that the supply of investment is highly elastic. 
Second, while domestic production exceeds purchases for the entire sample period, the gap 
between the two is gradually closing.  As U.S. manufacturing has declined, domestic firms have 
become more and more reliant on imported capital goods. 
Finally, in the price data, there is a dramatic transitory downward spike in the early-mid 
1970’s.  The cause of the spike is a sharp increase in world oil prices. Following the increase in 
oil prices, the PCE price series used to construct relative investment-goods prices reacts very 
rapidly while the investment price indices react with a modest delay.  This is probably because oil 
prices are passed through directly to gasoline prices, which receive substantial weight in the PCE 
deflator.  The timing of price increases across goods was also likely affected by the Nixon price 
controls.  We address this issue in the econometric specification. 
Aggregate Data.  In addition to the type-specific data on investment, investment prices and 
investment tax subsidies, we also make use of several aggregate data series.  Specifically, we use 
data on real GDP, real oil prices and dummy variables for the Nixon price controls.  Quarterly data 
on real GDP are from the BEA.  To construct real oil prices, we average the monthly spot oil price 
(West Texas Intermediate) to construct a quarterly nominal series.  We then take the ratio of the 
quarterly oil price to the PCE deflator for non-durables.  Finally, the Nixon price controls were 
part of the Economic Stabilization Program and went into effect on August 15, 1971 and were 
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removed on April 30, 1974.5  The price controls play a non-trivial role in price data for that period.  
We accommodate this policy with dummy variables.  Given the timing of the legislation, our 
dummy variable for the Nixon price controls takes the value 0.6 for 1971:3 and 1.0 for 1971:4 to 
1974:1.6 
2.4. EFFECTS OF INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES 
This section presents reduced-form empirical results.  We begin in section 2.4.1 by discussing our 
basic regression specification.  In section 2.4.2 we present the main estimates.  The reduced-form 
coefficients later serve as a basis for the structural estimates of the quantitative model. 
2.4.1 Econometric Specification 
We estimate the effects of investment tax subsidies on the production and purchases of investment 
goods, their prices, imports and exports of capital goods, as well a host of variables that reflect 
producer activity, including employment, payroll, production employees, production hours, 
production wages, TFP, inventories, the cost of materials and the cost of energy used by producers.  
We present pooled OLS results to paint a broad picture of how tax subsidies affect the production 
and purchases of capital goods. 
We consider three distinct measures of investment tax subsidies: the comprehensive subsidy, 
the investment tax credit and the Jorgensonian tax term described in Section 2.3.  The basic 
econometric specification is given by 
  1m m m m m mt t t ty b subsidy b t e     X  (5) 
Here m denotes the type of investment good and t denotes time, mty  is any measure of interest (e.g., 
m
ty  could be the log of investment production, purchases, prices, employment in capital producing 
firms, etc.), mtsubsidy  is any one of the three measures of investment tax subsidies discussed above, 
m
tX  is a set of covariates (which could include type-specific data and/or aggregate data) and m  is 
the associated set of type-specific regressors.  For each type, we also include a type-specific time 
                                                          
5 Source: National Archives.  See http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/432.html. 
6 Our dates and the dummy variable specification agree with the dates used by Goolsbee (1998).  Robert J. Gordon 
(1990) dates the expiration of the price controls as 1974:4.   
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trend given by  mb t .  The coefficient of interest in equation (5) is 1b .  This coefficient, which is 
constrained to be common across the types of capital goods (thus there is no superscript m), describes 
the average change in the variable of interest mty  associated with changes in the investment tax 
subsidy. 
We present results for four different regression specifications.  The first is a parsimonious 
specification including, in addition to the subsidy itself, only a constant and a linear trend.  The 
second and third specifications include a constant, a time trend – quadratic for the price regressions 
and linear for all other variables –  and a set of macroeconomic covariates: HP-filtered GDP and 
dummy variables for years affected by the price controls during the Nixon administration.  The third 
specification also includes the real price of oil.  The fourth specification uses a linear trend all 
macroeconomic covariates, and also includes two lags and two leads of the subsidy variable.  This 
last specification is intended to capture anticipation effects or measurement lags in the data.  Because 
investment and investment policy are highly correlated across time and across capital types we use 
the heteroskedasticity and autocovariance consistent estimate of the standard errors proposed by 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998). 
Before proceeding to the results themselves it is appropriate to make a remark about the 
interpretation of the findings.  In particular, we want to be upfront about the important endogeneity 
problems our estimates face.  Investment tax policy in the U.S., while capricious, is not truly 
econometrically exogenous.  To the extent that investment tax incentives react endogenously to 
economic conditions, as for instance the CARS program did in the Mian and Sufi (2012) study, our 
results will be biased indicators of the true causal effects of investment tax subsidies.  In particular, 
the “bonus depreciation” allowances offered from 2001–2004.and from 2008 to the present were 
explicitly countercyclical.  On the other hand, most of the legislative changes to investment tax 
incentives in our sample were exogenous, as Romer and Romer (2009) argue in their narrative 
analysis of postwar tax legislation.  The motivations cited by law makers when they expanded 
investment subsidies in the 1960s and 1970s centered on increasing long-run growth by encouraging 
firms to increase and modernize the capital stock.  When the subsidies were pared back in the 1980s, 
the goals were reducing the deficit and eliminating tax distortions.  We present the chronology of 
the main legislative changes to the ITC and tax depreciation allowances in Table 2.1.  Since most 
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changes were not related to the business cycle, but motivated by supply-side considerations, the 
effects of endogeneity on our estimates are likely limited. 
2.4.2 Reduced-Form Estimates 
The reduced-form estimates are presented in Tables 2.2–2.6.  Table 2.2 reports the results for how 
investment subsidies affect the production and purchases of capital goods.  Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show 
how the subsidies affect employment, wages and productive inputs in equipment producing firms.  
Table 2.5 shows how investment incentives affect equipment prices.  Table 2.6 shows how 
investment incentives affect the production of business structures.  Each table includes the four 
econometric specifications discussed above and reports different sets of results for the three 
measures of the investment subsidy. 
Purchases and Production of Capital Goods.  We begin with how investment tax subsidies affect 
the purchases and production of new capital equipment by U.S. firms.  The results are presented in 
Table 2.2.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of investment production or investment 
purchases as indicated.  The coefficients in the table are for the measure of the subsidy (in levels).  
The standard errors are heteroskedasticity and autocovariance consistent (Driscoll-Kraay). 
As one would expect, when investment subsidies are relatively high, investment purchases 
and production are also relatively high.  Looking across specifications, most of the results are 
statistically significantly different from zero.  More importantly, the estimates are economically 
significant.  Consider the first row of coefficients.  The dependent variable is the natural log of 
investment production and the independent variable is the comprehensive investment subsidy.  
Looking across the row, the estimates indicate that a one percent investment subsidy is associated 
with an increase in investment production of between 0.78 and 1.15 percent.  The second row reports 
the estimates for investment purchases.  Again, the results are economically significant – a one 
percent investment incentive is associated with an increase in investment purchases of between 1.26 
and 1.93 percent. 
Importantly, there is some evidence of “leakage” – that is, some of the stimulus benefits 
foreign rather than domestic producers.  The leakage of investment tax stimulus to imports is a key 
reason that such policies are less stimulative than their effects on investment purchases might imply. 
Overall, these basic quantitative patterns carry over to the other measures of investment 
subsidies.  Perhaps the most natural set of estimates is that for the ITC alone because the ITC is 
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likely the most salient form of investment subsidy we consider.  For the ITC measure, the results are 
somewhat more pronounced.  Depending on the econometric specification, production increases by 
between 1.02 and 2.66 percent while purchases rise by between 1.69 and 3.31 percent.  The bottom 
two rows (for the Jorgensonian tax term) show a similar pattern though it is worth noting that overall, 
these estimates are less statistically significant.  This is not an unusual occurrence and is perhaps to 
be expected given the intemperate nature of the data. 
Equipment Prices.  Goolsbee’s 1998 paper made a case that one of the main reasons that investment 
tax incentives were not as effective as one might hope is that much of the subsidies are passed 
through to capital goods prices.  An investment subsidy might bid up prices of capital goods but not 
cause increased production.7 
 Table 2.3 presents estimates of the reaction of capital goods prices to the three measures of 
investment tax subsidies.  As we did in Table 2.2, we report results for both the BEA purchase data 
and for the NBER productivity dataset.  Unlike Goolsbee’s estimates, our estimates show little or no 
price response for equipment.  In fact, of the five statistically significant estimates, four have the 
“wrong” sign.  Most of the estimates are close to zero.  From the point of view of basic economic 
analysis, sensible estimates would be between 0.00 and 1.00.  While there is again considerable 
variability coming from changes in econometric specification, the overall conclusion from the 
estimates in Table 2.3 is that prices essentially don’t react to the subsidies.  We have made efforts to 
explain the difference between our findings and the findings in Goolsbee’s earlier paper.  The two 
sets of estimates differ both in sample period (Goolsbee’s sample was 1962–1988 while we use data 
from 1959–2009) and in the vintage of the data – that is, the data have been updated and revised 
substantially since Goolsbee’s original paper was published.  Both factors contribute to the different 
results.  Appendix 2.A presents a detailed comparison between our findings and Goolsbee’s results.  
In brief, we are able to replicate Goolsbee’s results for his estimation period and vintage data.  Our 
results differ mainly because we study an extended sample period and the data have been revised. 
Employment, Wages, Inputs and Productivity of Capital Producers.  Another way to quantify the 
effects of investment tax subsidies is to examine the productive inputs of capital producing firms.  
                                                          
7 The standard neoclassical theory of investment demand predicts that, particularly for temporary investment subsidies, 
capital goods prices must rise nearly one-for-one with the subsidy regardless of the elasticity of supply. Thus, 
observing sharp price increases following an investment subsidy does not suggest that the policy has little effect. See 
House and Shapiro (2008) for extended discussion of this point.   
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Table 2.4 reports results for employment, hours and wages of workers in capital producing firms.  
As we did above, we report results for each of the three measures of investment subsidies separately.  
The data on the left-hand side are from the NBER productivity dataset, so they are somewhat 
independent measures from those in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. 
 Consistent with the results from Table 2.2, employment and hours are positively associated 
with high investment subsidies.  A one percent increase in the ITC, increases employment and hours 
by roughly 2 percent.  Results for the comprehensive subsidy are somewhat less consistent across 
specifications.  Most of the results are smaller than the results for the ITC alone and while most of 
the estimates have the “right” sign, there are specifications that give inverted results.  The 
Jorgensonian tax term again indicates that investment subsidies increase production in capital 
producing firms. Given the relative scale of the Jorgensonian term and the ITC, the quantitative 
responses are roughly comparable to the estimates for the ITC alone.  In addition to total employment 
and hours at capital producing firms, wages at those firms are also increase with investment 
subsidies.  Goolsbee (1998) also emphasizes this point and our updated estimates agree with his 
earlier results. 
 Table 2.5 shows additional measures of production activity at capital-producing firms.  
Consistent with earlier results, materials costs, energy costs and measured total factor productivity 
all rise in response to investment subsidies suggesting that these firms do actively expand production 
of capital goods.  Roughly speaking, a one percent investment subsidy is associated with increased 
purchases of productive inputs and measured TFP between 0.32 and 5.11 percent.  All of these 
responses are consistent with an overall increase in production of capital goods.  The increase in 
measured productivity suggests that firms are varying unmeasured inputs in addition to measured 
factor inputs such as worker effort.  It is worth pointing out that many of these estimates are not fully 
robust to changes in econometric specification.  Some of the specifications produce results at odds 
with the conventional understanding of how investment tax incentives work.  Overall, however, the 
estimates in Tables 2.2, 2.4 and 2.6 are all telling the same story. 
Investment Subsidies and Structures Investment.  While much of the existing literature focuses on 
investment in equipment, U.S. tax policy also provides strong incentives for purchases of business 
structures.  Importantly, the neoclassical theory of investment suggests that structures investment 
should be much more sensitive to predictable variations in its after-tax price than equipment 
investment (see House and Shapiro 2008).  Unlike equipment investment, there is essentially no 
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difference between domestic purchases and domestic production of business structures (i.e., there 
are no imported structures to speak of). 
 Table 2.6 presents estimates on the effect of investment subsidies for investment in 
business structures.  The data used here come from the BEA underlying detail tables.  Again we 
report separate results for each of our subsidy measures and separate results for prices and quantities.  
As we found with the effects of subsidies on purchases and production of equipment, purchases (and 
production) of structures respond to variations in investment tax incentives.  For a one percent 
investment tax subsidy, structures investment rises between 0.21 and 4.73 percent. Unlike the 
findings for equipment and software, there is evidence that structures prices do respond to investment 
tax incentives though there is still substantial variation in the estimates across econometric 
specifications.   
Although investment subsidies for structures are generally lower than subsidies for 
equipment, and notably structures do not receive the ITC, the estimated effects are sizeable.  Overall, 
the reduced-form estimates for structures are larger than the estimates for equipment. This pattern 
could be generated by a variety of factors.  First, equilibrium complementarities between equipment 
and structures may cause structures investment to rise when tax policies stimulate investment in 
equipment.  Second, changes in tax depreciation allowances, which directly affect structures, are 
correlated with changes in the ITC.  The most prominent example is Tax Reform Act of 1986, which 
both repealed the ITC and dramatically limited accelerated depreciation, and many other legislative 
changes modified both forms of tax incentives in the same direction (see Table 2.1).  Lastly, 
structures have low rates of economic depreciation, which implies high intertemporal elasticities of 
substitution.  As a result, structures investment is more sensitive to changes in the after-tax price of 
capital. 
Investment Subsidies and International Trade in Equipment.  The effects of investment tax 
incentives on equipment imports and exports are particularly interesting for assessing the general 
equilibrium implications of these policies.  Using a separate dataset on international trade in 
equipment, we find clear evidence that investment tax incentives stimulate imports.  In other 
words, investment subsidies “leak” through international trade, benefitting foreign capital 
producers.  In addition, the data suggest that exports rise when subsidies are high.  Due to 
inconsistencies and differences in measurement relative to our main data, the scope of our trade 
analysis is more limited.  We present our international trade results in Appendix 2.B. 
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2.5. QUANTITATIVE MODEL 
In this section we present a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model with many real-world 
features.  There are M capital producing industries, including both equipment and structures, and 
one industry that produces a numeraire good.  The model features variable effort and capital and 
labor adjustment costs in all sectors.  Labor income, dividends and profits are subject to distortionary 
taxes, while investment receives subsidies.  Equipment and the numeraire good can be traded 
internationally.  We require period-by-period balanced trade, which implies that trade in equipment 
is accompanied by offsetting trade flows of the final good.  Structures are not traded, so the 
production and investment in structures are indistinguishable.  We estimate the structural parameters 
of the model to match the reduced-form empirical results in section 2.4.  We then use the model to 
quantify the aggregate effects of investment tax policy. 
2.5.1. Households 
The representative household consumes the non-durable final good, supplies labor and effort on the 
job, saves at the risk-free rate, pays taxes and owns the capital stock.  The household derives utility 
from consumption and disutility from labor and effort.  The household’s utility function is 
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We start by describing the household’s labor supply in the M + 1 sectors of the economy.  The 
household spends mtn  hours working in each capital-producing sector m and 
Q
tn  hours working in 
the final goods sector.  For each hour of labor, the household receives pre-tax real wages mtW  and 
Q
tW in the capital industries and the numeraire sector, respectively.  We assume that the household’s 
aggregate labor index has the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form 
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The elasticity of labor substitution across sectors is n .  If 0n  , then there is only limited 
substitutability of labor across sectors.  In this case, a permanent investment tax subsidy will drive a 
permanent wedge between wages in subsidized and not-subsidized sectors.  This specification also 
nests the special case when 0 n  and the household supplies labor to each sector symmetrically.   
Total hours spent working is denoted by  
 
1
MQ m
t t tm
N n n

  .  (8) 
In the steady state, the CES labor aggregate and total hours are equivalent, more specifically, 
.V N   This relationship is obtained by choosing the constant terms ,  Q ma a  in the labor aggregate 
such that  / nm ma n N   for 1,...,m M .  Effort in each capital-goods producing sector m is 
denoted by mte  and 
Q
te  indicates effort in the numeraire sector.  Each hour of effort entails a utility 
cost of  . 
Formally, the household seeks to maximize its expected discounted utility  
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subject to the budget constraint 
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and the capital accumulation constraints  
  1 1 .m m m m mt t t tK K I IMP      (11) 
The representative household owns the capital stock mtK  for all types 1,...,m M .  The 
household may purchase new capital from domestic producers mtI  or from importers 
m
tIMP .  The 
pre-tax price of type m capital in units of the numeraire good at date t is mtP .  The pre-tax real rental 
price of type m capital is mtR .  Each type of capital has a type-specific depreciation rate 
m
t .  As we 
show in Section 2.5.7, depreciation rates play a key role in how each type responds to investment 
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subsidies.  In addition to investing in physical capital, the household saves in bonds tS , which earn 
the net real safe rate of return tr . 
A key feature of the model is its realistic treatment of tax policy, which allows analyzing the 
aggregate effects of investment tax incentives once we estimate the structural parameters.  Purchases 
of capital goods receive type-specific investment subsidies.  The comprehensive investment tax 
subsidy for type m at date t is mt .  Capital income is taxed twice – once at the profit tax rate t
  and 
again according to the tax rate on distributed capital earnings dt .  Labor income is taxed at the 
constant rate N .  In addition to the distortionary taxes N , dt  and t
  the government also remits 
excess revenue to the household through a lump-sum transfer (or tax) tT . 
The solution to the household’s optimization problem requires the following first order 
conditions, 
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Equation (12) is the household’s labor supply condition for sector m (abusing notation somewhat, 
we include the first order condition for m = Q in equation (12) as well).  This equation serves as 
the effort-wage menu faced by the firms.  Equation (13) is the stochastic Euler equation.  Equation 
(14) is the shadow value of type m capital and equation (15) is investment demand for type m 
capital (either imported or domestically produced). 
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2.5.2. Firms and Production 
Aggregate Capital Services.  The individual capital types 1...m M  owned by the household are 
aggregated to produce a single capital input.  The aggregate capital good is denoted by Ht and is 
produced according to the Cobb-Douglas production function  
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We assume that 
1
1M mm    so the production of the aggregate capital good has constant returns 
to scale.  Firms that produce the capital aggregate sell the aggregate good for a rental price Rt and 
pay type-specific rental prices mtR .  Each period these firms choose   1
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subject to the production function (16).  The first order condition for the choice of mtK  is  
 mtt m tm
t
HR R
K
  . (18) 
The scalar term 
1
m
M
mm

 in (16) ensures that the rental price for the capital aggregate is a 
weighted average of the rental prices of the type-specific rental prices.  In equilibrium profits are 
zero for these firms. 
The Numeraire Good.  The numeraire good can be used as either the final consumption good, 
government purchases, payment for purchases of imported capital goods or as material input for 
the capital goods industries.  The numeraire good is produced with aggregate capital Qth , labor 
Q
tn  
and effort Qte .  The output elasticity of effort is given by the parameter  . The production function 
is  
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The producers of the numeraire good rent capital and labor and choose effort to maximize their 
discounted profits 
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subject to the production function (19) and the wage-effort supply schedule (12).  The parameters 
n and h are adjustment cost parameters for labor and capital.  Adjustment costs are standard in 
the DSGE literature.  It is important to note that in a multi-sector model adjustment costs act 
through two distinct channels: they temper both the intertemporal substitution and the reallocation 
of capital and labor inputs across sectors.  
Firms may ask workers to provide additional effort but doing so requires a higher wage.  
Note that, as long as the production elasticity of effort is below unity ( 1  ), the firm’s demand 
for additional effort will be bounded.  Another interpretation of effort input, which is effectively 
equivalent with the specification we adopt in this study, is overtime to extend the work week.  In 
this case, the output elasticity of effort   represents the shift premium households require to 
compensate them for working outside standard work hours.  Including effort as a separate input 
allows measured TFP to increase in response to investment tax incentives, as it does in the data. 
This simple specification imparts realism to the model, but as we show in section 2.5.7 below, it 
remains somewhat limited in its ability to match the magnitude of the TFP response in our reduced-
form estimates. 
The solution to the firm’s optimization problem requires the following first order 
conditions, 
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and 
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Equations (21) and (22) are the firm’s intertemporal demand curves for capital and labor 
respectively.  Equation (23) gives the firm’s effort demand choice.  This condition says that the 
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firm’s choice of effort balances the after-tax marginal benefit of additional effort (the left-hand-
side) with the marginal cost of additional effort (the right-hand-side).  Not surprisingly, effort is 
an increasing function of the marginal product of labor. 
Domestic Capital Producers.  Each type of capital is produced with units of the capital aggregate
m
th , labor 
m
tn , effort 
m
te  and materials 
m
tx  (units of the numeraire good).  The production function 
for each type of capital is 
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. (24) 
The capital producers maximize the expected discounted value of profits, 
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The first order conditions for the optimal choices of mtx , 
m
tn , 
m
th  and 
m
te  are  
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, (26) 
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The marginal product of labor and the marginal product of capital are given by  
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where         1 1h h hm m m mt t t tU h e n     .  Equations (26), (27) and (28) are the firm’s demand curves 
for materials, labor hours and the aggregate capital input, respectively.  Equation (29), which is 
analogous to (23), is the firm’s effort demand curve. 
Imported Capital.  International trade in equipment is a prominent feature of the U.S. economy.  
In our data, equipment investment differs substantially from domestic production.  Figure 2.1 
illustrates the time-varying wedge between the purchases and the domestic production of general 
industrial equipment, one of the capital types in our dataset.  International trade offers an additional 
margin for increasing investment in response to investment subsidies. In Appendix 2.B, we present 
evidence that imports rise sharply when investment tax incentives are high.  Including capital 
imports in the model is thus essential given that estimation strategy is to match the empirical 
reduced-form estimates in Section 2.4.2 with the corresponding estimates obtained from simulated 
model data.  We adopt a simple specification that abstracts from international borrowing and 
lending, assuming that there are no trade deficits or surpluses. 
We model the international trade margin with a simple investment import supply curve.  
We assume that in the initial non-stochastic steady state, there are no imported capital goods.  The 
parametric form for the import supply curve is  
 1
m
m m t
t m
PIMP I
P
          
 (32) 
where mI  is the amount of type m capital produced in the steady state and   is the import supply 
elasticity.  If 0  then the model collapses to a closed economy with no interaction with foreign 
capital importers.  If    then the model becomes a “small open economy” with regard to the 
capital goods markets.  In this latter case, the domestic price of capital goods will be pinned down 
by the importing firms.  Finally, we assume period-by-period balanced trade, which requires that 
international trade in equipment is accompanied by offsetting trade flows of the final consumption 
good.  We describe the role of imports in how the economy responds to investment tax incentives 
in Section 2.5.7. 
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2.5.3. Resource Constraints and Real GDP 
The total amount of the numeraire good is used for either consumption of the final good, materials 
inputs for the capital producers, government purchases or payment for imported capital goods from 
abroad.  Formally, the resource constraint for the numeraire good is  
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Aggregate capital and materials must satisfy  
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Real gross domestic product (GDP) is the sum of all final goods and services produced in a given 
period evaluated at the steady state pre-tax prices.  We let Yt denote real GDP.  Thus,  
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Note that imports do not enter the real GDP identity (36) because the model assumes period-by-
period balanced trade.  While equipment can be imported, equal exports of the numeraire good are 
offered in exchange. 
2.5.4. Exogenous Processes 
The model dynamics are generated by exogenous structural innovations to the taxation of capital 
income ( t
  and dt ) and investment subsidies   1Mmt m .  For simplicity, we suppress other 
sources of uncertainty typically present in DSGE models.  Let  
 1, , ,...,d Mt t t t t
         
 
   (37) 
denote the vector of deviations for the structural exogenous variables at date t.  We assume that 
t  follows a known VAR process  
 1t t t   ε , (38) 
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where tε  is the date-t vector of structural innovations and  'E  εε  is a known variance-
covariance matrix.  For the simulations below, we assume that the autoregressive matrix   is 
diagonal.  In our baseline specification we set   I  so all shocks are perceived to be “permanent” 
by the firms and workers. 
2.5.5. Steady State and Calibrated Parameters 
Non-Stochastic Steady State.  We choose the scaling parameters ,   and mB B    to ensure that 
1mP P N e     in the non-stochastic steady state.  With this normalization, it is easy to show 
that, in the steady state, the investment ratios must satisfy  
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. (39) 
Additionally, 1m mn n   and 1m mx x   so there is a constant material to labor ratio across 
investment sectors.  Similarly, 1 1( / )m m mK K    and 1m mh h   for all m. 
Calibration.  Many of the parameters are calibrated to “standard” values used in the 
macroeconomic literature.  We set the quarterly discount factor   to 0.97 which implies a 4 
percent annual real interest rate.  The Frisch labor supply elasticity   is set to 0.5, in line with 
recent estimates (see Farber 2005 and Kimball and Shapiro 2008).  We set  , the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution, to 0.2, roughly the average of the estimates in Hall (1988), Campbell 
and Mankiw (1989) and Barsky, et al. (1997).  Based on calculations in House and Shapiro (2008), 
we set the steady state tax rates to 0.36N  , 0.30d  and 0.22  . 
To calibrate labor’s share for the numeraire (Q) sector, we take total employee 
compensation as a fraction of total GDP less proprietors’ income.  This share has been roughly 
constant in the post war period and, using data up to 2009, implies 1 0.62  .8  This calculation 
implicitly assumes that proprietors’ income is divided proportionally between labor income and 
capital income. 
We allow for M = 35 different types of capital.  There are 24 equipment classes and 11 
structures classes.  For the most part, the types conform to the BEA investment categories.  There 
are some types which are grouped together because they have the same investment subsidy 
                                                          
8 See Elsby et al. (2013) for a discussion of recent changes to the U.S. labor’s share.  
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treatments and the same economic depreciation rates.  In addition, unlike we do in the empirical 
specification, we include computers and software and residential investment in the model.  
Investment in computers and software is a significant fraction of total equipment investment and 
thus its tax treatment influences the equilibrium.  The economic rates of depreciation for each type 
of capital are based primarily on Fraumeni (1997), who has estimated depreciation using 
techniques established by Hulten and Wykoff (1981a, 1981b).  Together with data on average 
investment shares ( 1/mI I ) and average investment subsidies ( m ) we use equation (39) to 
calculate implied values for m .  Tables 2.8 and 2.9 list the capital classes in the model together 
with their associated depreciation rates, investment shares (as a fraction of total investment) and 
their average investment subsidies. 
 To calibrate the share parameters h  and x  we use data on input shares from the NBER 
productivity dataset.  Relative to labor’s share for GDP, labor’s share of gross investment output 
(for equipment production) is quite low and has been falling over our sample period.  Averaging 
over all of the types in our data, labor’s share fell from roughly 20 percent in the late 1960’s to 
roughly 9 percent by 2009.  For purposes of calibrating the model we assume that labor’s share of 
gross output in the capital producing sectors is 14 percent (roughly the average over all types and 
time periods).  This corresponds to an average labor’s share in the value-added production 
functions of 25 percent.  Material’s share of gross output is approximately 45 percent.9  Taken 
together, the implied capital share in gross output is in steady state,  1m m h hRh Wn     which 
implies 0.75h  : 
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We use the same parameters for structures as for equipment though we have no independent data 
for structures.  We calibrate the parameter x  to match the observed materials ratio /m mX I  given 
the elasticity of substitution  .  In the steady state, 
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. (41) 
                                                          
9 We include energy in total material inputs.  Energy is a small fraction of gross investment output, roughly 1 percent.   
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For each substitution parameter  , we set x  according to (41) to match a materials to investment 
ratio / 0.45m mX I  .  For our baseline calibration we set 0.01   which implies that there is 
essentially no substitution between materials and the input composite mtU  (for this value of  , the 
implied calibration for x  is quite small).10  
Labor and Capital Adjustment Costs.  The labor and capital adjustment cost parameters n  and 
h  are calibrated using combined evidence from several different studies.  Caballero and Engel 
(1993) use data on gross and net employment flows for U.S. manufacturing from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.  They estimate a quadratic adjustment cost parameter of 0.53 for net flows and 
0.28 for gross flows, although they prefer a specification with fixed costs.11 Shapiro (1986b) 
estimates employment adjustment costs of 0.23–0. 34 for non-production workers, and zero for all 
other workers. 
 To calibrate capital adjustment costs, we consider the literature on the Q-elasticity of 
investment, as well as studies that directly estimate adjustment costs.  If the capital adjustment cost 
is quadratic, as in our model, the adjustment cost parameter h  is inversely proportional with the 
Q elasticity, which can be estimated using an equation of the form 
 0 1    t t t t
t
I a a Q bX
K
, (42) 
where tI is investment, tK  is the capital stock, and  tX  is a vector of covariates.  Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1995) use annual firm-level data from Compustat to measure the elasticity of 
investment to both “fundamental” Q and Tobin’s Q, finding elasticities between 0.33 and 0.1 
respectively once they adjust for cash flow.  For durable goods firms only, the elasticity estimates 
are 0.12 for fundamental Q and 0.06 for Tobin’s Q.  Cooper and Ejarque (2003) use a structural 
model to estimate Q elasticities of between 0.165–0.231. Shapiro (1986b) estimates investment 
adjustment costs of 0.21–0.25.  
                                                          
10 If we estimate the materials substitution elasticity () the estimates are pushed to 0.00.  We suspect this reflects the 
fact that there is a high degree of correlation between production and materials throughout the data sample.  This 
estimate echoes a recent finding by Boehm et al. (2014). See also Atalay (2014). 
11 Cooper and Willis (2009) use the empirical results of Caballero and Engel (1993) to estimate a set of structural 
models with asymmetric labor adjustment costs.  Their estimates for the quadratic costs specification are 7.9 for 
positive adjustment and -0.28 for negative adjustment, however neither coefficient is statistically significant.   
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 In our multi-sector model, adjustment costs represent both frictions related to the 
intertemporal adjustment of the capital and employment within industries, as well as frictions 
arising when factors of production are reallocated across industries.  The investment tax subsidies 
in the model produce strong incentives to substitute across types, which may be quite difficult in 
reality.  For example, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) document substantial costs of moving capital 
from the aerospace industry to other sectors. 
 Given the relatively wide range of adjustment costs estimated in the literature, and the fact 
that we specify a multi-sector model rather than a single sector like in most of these studies, we 
consider three distinct calibrations of the adjustment cost parameters.  In the low-cost calibration, 
we set 0 n  and 3.30 h ; in the medium-cost calibration, 0.10 n  and 10 h ; finally, in 
the high-cost calibration, 0.30 n  and 20 h . 
2.5.6. Estimated Parameters 
The remaining parameters ,  ,    n  are estimated.  We use an indirect inference approach similar 
to the one proposed by Gourieroux, Montfort and Renault (1993).  Specifically, let , ,       
n  
denote the vector of parameters.  Our procedure is roughly as follows.  For any given parameter 
vector   we simulate the post-war investment trajectories implied by the model using shocks to 
investment subsidies and tax rates as forcing variables.  We run regressions of the form (5) for the 
simulated data and recover the implied reduced-form coefficients.  We then choose the parameters 
  to make the simulated regression coefficients and their reduced-form analogues match as 
closely as possible. 
Simulating the Path of Investment Subsidies in the Post-War Period.  Equation (38) describes the 
evolution of the exogenous forcing processes.  Given the matrix   we can construct a path of 
shocks that generates the investment subsidies and tax rates observed over the time period of our 
data sample.  Specifically, given our observations on the subsidy mt  and the tax rates ,  
d
t t
  we 
construct the structural innovations as  
 1t t t  ε . (43) 
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Since our baseline calibration is   I , the shocks are simply the observed differences in 
the calculated subsidy and the tax rates.  Because the subsidy and the tax rates are mechanically 
related to each other (recall (2) and (4)), it is important to include the exact path of rates in the 
simulation.  With the structural innovations, we can simulate the economy’s dynamic reaction to 
the shocks. 
Indirect Inference.  Given a parameter vector  , , n    , we simulate paths for the endogenous 
variables             , , , , ,     m m m m m mt t t t t tI n W x IMP TFP  taking the other calibrated 
parameters as given as described above.  We then run regressions of the form (5) on the simulated 
data.12  Let  b  denote the vector of regression coefficients associated with the simulation for a 
given parameter vector   and let databˆ  be the corresponding vector of coefficient estimates from 
the data.  Our parameter estimate ˆ  is the solution to the minimum distance problem  
    1ˆ ˆˆ ˆarg min data data
                      
b b b b   (44) 
where ˆVar data     b .
13  Under the usual conditions, the estimate is asymptotically normally 
distributed with a finite covariance matrix  *ˆ ,N   .  The estimated covariance matrix of the 
indirect inference estimator is a natural function of the covariance matrix of the reduced-form 
parameter estimates  
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Since the estimated variance covariance matrix ˆ  is heteroskedasticity and autocovariance 
consistent, the estimated variance covariance matrix ˆ  will be as well. 
                                                          
12 We include GDP in the regressions on the simulated data but we exclude the remaining macroeconomic covariates. 
There are neither oil shocks nor price-controls in the model. Excluding GDP could have a modest influence on the 
results since tax policy likely has a non-negligible influence on aggregate economic activity.   
13 We solve for the parameters that minimize the distance between the reduced-form coefficients obtained from the 
data and from the model by solving a bounded optimization problem.  For each structural parameter, we define a set 
of admissible values.  We start the optimization from a set of random points in the admissible parameter space to avoid 
convergence to a local minimum.  
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The indirect inference estimates are reported in upper panel of Table 2.7.  There are several 
noteworthy features of these estimates.  First, the estimates for the import supply elasticity ( ) are 
substantial – between 2 and 4.  These estimates suggest that, at least for capital goods, U.S. markets 
are closely tied to international pricing.  Second, the production elasticity of effort ( ) is fairly 
high – about 0.65.  This says that a one percent increase in effort is essentially equivalent to two 
thirds of a percent increase in effective labor.  Lastly, the elasticity of type-specific labor 
substitution ( n ) is considerable at 2.23–2.52, which suggests that there are significant barriers to 
reallocating employment across industries. 
The lower panel of Table 2.7 compares the regression coefficients for the estimated model 
with the corresponding reduced-form regression coefficients from the actual data.  We include the 
coefficients for effort and capital, which do not have empirical analogues, but add insight into the 
dynamics of the model. The model fits reasonably well along some dimensions, but does not 
successfully replicate all empirical coefficients.  As in the data, equipment purchases increase by 
roughly 1.5 percent, about twice as much as investment production.  Both responses are close to 
those in the data, but somewhat more muted.  In contrast, structures investment is more responsive 
in the model, suggesting that although structures differ from equipment in their depreciation rates 
and subsidy rates, the model does not capture all sources of heterogeneity present in reality.  The 
coefficients for the wage bill and material inputs are materially similar to the reduced-form 
estimates. 
The response of productivity (TFP) is considerably more attenuated in the model, where it 
exclusively reflects increased effort, while in the data there are additional factors that push up 
productivity, such as increased capital utilization.  Although effort strongly reacts to the subsidy – 
the estimates suggest investment subsidies drives up effort one to one – it is not sufficient to 
generate an increase in TFP of the same magnitude as in the data.  Similarly, the model increase 
in hours is only about half of that measured in the historical time series. 
2.5.7. Reaction to Investment Subsidies 
In this section, we evaluate the effects of an investment subsidy on investment, the prices of capital 
goods, the productivity of capital producers, and macroeconomic aggregates.  The model is 
simulated with the estimated parameters in Table 2.7.  We consider the simulated response to an 
investment subsidy that applies only to equipment.  Structures do not qualify.  This distinction 
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between equipment and structures mirrors the typical investment tax credit.  The typical depreciation 
allowances are offered for all types of investment, however their present discounted value is 
inversely related to the life of the asset, thus they are more limited for structures.  In the model, the 
steady state subsidy equals the average historical subsidy for each type. 
We consider three policy experiments.  Figure 2.4 shows the reaction to a permanent subsidy 
in the baseline model.  In Figure 2.5, we consider a closed economy to illustrate the role of imports.  
We set the import supply elasticity to zero, and all remaining parameters remain as in the baseline 
specification.  In Figure 2.6, we consider a temporary subsidy, specified as an autoregressive process 
with half-life of one year.  This approximation was chosen for tractability, while loosely 
corresponding to historical situations when the subsidy was set to expire, but there was uncertainty 
about the precise timing of its expiration.  For example, the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 offered 
bonus depreciation, allowing firms to deduct 50 percent of the cost of qualifying capital purchases 
in addition to the regular depreciation allowance during that year.  The subsidy was extended through 
2009 by The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, then extended again in subsequent years 
(at 100 percent for 2011).  Bonus depreciation is currently set to expire in 2016. 
For each experiment, we report impulse response paths selected capital types.  In the top left 
panel of Figures 2.4–2.6 we show industrial equipment, which accounts for 5.55 percent of aggregate 
investment between 1990–2009 and has a depreciation rate of 11 percent, relatively low among 
equipment types.  Both investment and domestic production rise immediately then continue rising 
for roughly four years, after which they start to level off toward a permanently higher steady state.  
Investment starts out higher than production, with the difference consisting of imports.  The gap 
narrows and reverses over time.  In the new steady state, the economy exports industrial equipment.  
In the top right panel, we show aircraft, which has the same depreciation rate of 11 percent, but 
represents a smaller share of aggregate investment at only 1.57 percent.  The response of aircraft is 
only slightly more attenuated than that of industrial equipment.  In contrast, computers and software, 
shown in the lower left panel, account for a similar share of aggregate investment as industrial 
equipment, but have a much higher depreciation rate of 30 percent.  Imports rise more sharply 
immediately after the subsidy is offered, but peak after only a few quarters and at a lower level than 
for industrial equipment.  The adjustment to steady state is significantly faster.  In the lower right 
panel we present the response of manufacturing structures, which did not qualify for the subsidy.  
Initially, investment falls as the response is dominated by substitution to subsidized types.  After 
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roughly four years, investment recovers, then continues to increase to a permanently higher level as 
the general equilibrium effects of higher production capacity take over.  In all four cases, investment 
prices start out in the same direction as investment purchases, and settle to a slightly lower level in 
the new steady state. 
The model features multiple sources of heterogeneity across capital goods types.  Equipment 
and structures differ fundamentally because only equipment can be imported.  For structures, 
investment equals domestic production.  Furthermore, as in reality, investment subsidies are more 
favorable for equipment.  Within each of these two broad categories of capital goods, types also 
differ in their economic depreciation rates and their role in the production of aggregate capital.  We 
calibrate the model to match actual investment shares from 1990–2009, reported in Table 2.7.  The 
impulse responses in Figure 2.4 show that in equilibrium, economic depreciation plays a significant 
role in each type’s response to investment subsidies.  Industrial equipment and aircraft, which have 
the same depreciation rate of 11 percent, have similar responses.  The response of aircraft, a 
significantly smaller sector, is only slightly attenuated.  In contrast, computers and software, which 
have a high depreciation rate of 30 percent, feature a considerably lower response.  Capital types 
with lower depreciation rates have higher elasticities of intertemporal substitution, thus they are 
more responsive to changes in after-tax prices. 
Figure 2.5 presents impulse responses to a 10 percent permanent subsidy for the same four 
types as in Figure 2.4, but assuming a closed economy.  Unsurprisingly, the short-run increase in 
investment is significantly lower than in the open economy.  The peak response occurs later and it 
is slightly lower in magnitude, but the final steady state is virtually identical.  Figure 2.6 considers 
a temporary 10 percent investment subsidy in the baseline open economy.  All three equipment types 
feature a dramatic immediate jump in investment, most of which is achieved through imports.  
Investment gradually declines, while production rises for several quarters before it starts reverting.  
Interestingly, industrial equipment and aircraft, the equipment types with lower depreciation rates, 
undershoot for an extended period of time before returning to the initial steady state.  Investment in 
manufacturing structures initially falls, then temporarily rises above steady state levels.  These 
impulse responses suggest that the temporary subsidy initially succeeds to stimulate investment in 
the eligible types.  For longer-lived assets, however, it creates a capital overhang which results in 
lower investment at extended horizons.  During this period, the economy substitutes to types that 
did not receive the subsidy, such as manufacturing structures.  Temporary subsidies simply bring 
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forward investment.  Mian and Sufi (2012) found evidence for a similar effect in their study of the 
CARS program.  These dynamic effects of temporary investment policies in general equilibrium 
highlight the need for policy makers to consider the potential distortionary implications of temporary 
versus permanent subsidies. 
Figure 2.7 shows cross-sectional and aggregate impulse response functions to a 10 percent 
permanent investment subsidy.  The upper right panel shows the capital goods production 
trajectories for the various types in the model.  Both the qualified investment types and the ineligible 
investment categories react to the subsidy.  The model features substitution across types.  Production 
for the subsidized capital types rises in the short-run while production for unqualified investment 
types falls.  For most subsidized types, it takes five years for investment production to increase by 
the full amount.  In the long run, the production of aggregate capital, production of all types, is 
permanently higher.  This result arises from complementarities between types in the production of 
aggregate capital.  In the new steady state, total investment and the aggregate capital stock are higher, 
as seen in the aggregate impulse responses shown in the lower right panel. 
The figure also reports impulse responses for capital goods prices (upper left panel) and 
measured productivity (lower right panel) to a 10 percent permanent investment subsidy.  In the 
short run, prices for subsidized types increase and prices for ineligible types fall.  The investment 
supply curve is upward sloping.  For imports, we have explicitly assumed in equation (32) that import 
supply slopes upward.  Capital adjustment costs in domestic production also generate an upward 
sloping relationship between investment and the pre-tax price for each type.  In the long run, as the 
productive capacity of the economy increases, the investment supply curve expands and prices for 
all types are permanently lower.  Importantly, the effect of the subsidy on prices is significantly 
smaller than the effect on production. 
The lower left panel of Figure 2.7 reports the impulse responses of sector-specific 
productivity to the 10 percent permanent investment subsidy.  Changes in measured productivity 
reflect exclusively variation in effort in the quantitative model, which abstracts from other factors 
that affect TFP in the real economy.  In the short run, productivity for subsidized types increases, 
while productivity for structures falls.  In the new steady state, productivity is higher for all types.  
As for prices, the magnitude of the effect is small.  These effects reflect equilibrium changes in effort 
inputs as capital producing firms change their production levels relative to steady state.  Firms 
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producing subsidized equipment types increase production and effort, while firms producing 
ineligible structure types decrease production and effort in the short-run. 
The lower right panel shows the impulse response functions for aggregate investment, 
consumption, employment and GDP.  In aggregate terms, there is a substantial immediate increase 
in aggregate investment while GDP, consumption and employment are only slightly affected.  Most 
of this increase is made up of imported capital goods. 
2.6. CONCLUSION 
We study the effects of investment tax incentives on investment, investment prices, the domestic 
production of equipment, and measures of activity at equipment-producing firms.  Our reduced-
form estimates indicate that investment subsidies are successful at increasing investment in both 
equipment and structures.  Domestic production rises in response to investment tax incentives, but 
less than investment, as the subsidies “leak” to foreign producers through imports of capital goods.  
Employment, hours, material use and inputs at capital goods-producers also increase.  Unlike 
Goolsbee (1998), we do not find evidence that investment subsidies affect the prices of investment 
goods. 
 We use the reduced-form estimates to calibrate a structural general equilibrium model with 
capital and labor adjustment costs, variable effort and international trade in equipment.  The 
structural estimates of the model parameters indicate that the import supply of equipment is fairly 
elastic.  In response to investment subsidies, there is strong variation in effort in equipment 
production.  The model also indicates that there is limited substitutability in labor supply across 
sectors. 
 The model generates sharp general-equilibrium predictions of the effects of plausible 
investment tax incentives to equipment on investment and macroeconomic aggregates.  The 
impulse response paths confirm the interpretation of our reduced-form results.  In response to 
investment subsidies, investment increases more than production, with equipment imports 
accounting for the difference. Across capital types, the magnitude of the response largely depends 
on the economic depreciation rate of each type.  In the short run, the response features substitution 
from ineligible types to subsidized types.  If the subsidy is permanent, it also increases structures 
investment in the long run.  If the subsidy is temporary, investment in long-lived equipment types 
experiences a “pothole” in the medium-run before the economy returns to the initial steady state.  
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Investment tax incentives increase hours, effort and measured productivity at equipment-
producing firms.  Capital goods prices, total hours and aggregate consumption are only slightly 
affected. 
 The reduced-form estimates and simulated policy experiments imply that investment tax 
incentives successfully stimulate investment in both equipment and structures.  Permanent 
subsidies result in a higher aggregate capital stock and thus promote long-run economic growth.  
As a stabilization policy, however, temporary investment tax incentives have clear disadvantages.  
While temporary subsidies increase investment and equipment production, their effectiveness as 
macroeconomic stimulus is reduced because a significant fraction of the subsidies “leaks” to 
foreign producers.  Additionally, their benefits for long-lived capital types are less clear, as the 
initial stimulus is followed by a decrease in the medium run after the subsidies expire.  Lastly, in 
the simulated data, the effects of temporary subsidies on the aggregate production of the final 
consumption good are negligible.
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TABLE 2.1. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF INVESTMENT TAX INCENTIVES 
Law Name Public Law 
Romer and 
Romer (2009) 
Classification 
Motivation Intended Duration 
Investment Tax 
Credit 
Depreciation 
Allowance 
Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954 
83-591 Exogenous Long-run Permanent  Double-declining balance 
method 
Small Business Tax 
Revision Act of 1958 
85-699 Exogenous Long-run Permanent  First-year depreciation 
for long-lived assets 
Revenue Act of 1962 87-834 Exogenous Long-run Permanent Introduced 7% ITC 
Limited for short-lived 
assets 
Public utilities excluded  
100% basis adjustment 
for ITC 
Tax Rate Extension 
Act of 1962 
87-507 Exogenous Long-run Permanent Public utilities eligible 
for 3% 
 
Revenue Act of 1964 88-272 Exogenous Long-run Permanent Simplified ITC Removed basis 
adjustment 
Suspension of 
Investment Tax 
Credit of 1966 
89-800 Endogenous Countercyclical Temporary Suspended ITC Limited accelerated 
depreciation 
Restoration of 
Investment Tax 
Credit 
90-26 Exogenous Long-run Permanent Reinstated ITC and 
increased ceiling 
 
Tax Reform Act of 
1969 
91-172 Exogenous 
Endogenous 
Long-run 
Countercyclical 
Permanent Repealed ITC  
Reform of 
Depreciation Rules of 
1971 
 Exogenous Long-run Permanent  Shortened the assumed 
life of  equipment and 
allowed more first year 
depreciation 
Revenue Act of 1971 92-178 Exogenous Long-run Permanent Restored ITC at 7% 
Limited for short-lived 
assets 
Public utilities eligible 
for 4% 
Introduced ADR system 
Lowered asset lifetimes 
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Law Name Public Law 
Romer and 
Romer (2009) 
Classification 
Motivation Intended Duration 
Investment Tax 
Credit 
Depreciation 
Allowance 
Tax Reduction Act of 
1975 
94-12 Endogenous Countercyclical Temporary Increased to 10% 
Extended 10% ITC to 
public utilities 
 
Tax Reform Act of 
1976 
94-455 Exogenous Long-run Temporary Extended 10% ITC 
through 1980 
 
Revenue Act of 1978 95-600 Exogenous Long-run Permanent Made 10% ITC 
permanent 
 
Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 
97-34 Exogenous Long-run Permanent Extended 10% ITC to 
short-lived assets 
Replaced ADR with 
ACRS 
Simplified asset-life 
classes 
Accelerated depreciation 
deductions 
Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 
1982 
97-248 Exogenous Deficit-driven Permanent  Repealed accelerated 
depreciation 
Deficit Reduction Act 
of 1984 
98-369 Exogenous Deficit-driven Permanent  Lengthened asset lives 
from 15 years to 18 years 
Tax Reform Act of 
1986 
99-514 Exogenous Long-run Permanent Repealed ITC Replaced ACRS with 
MACRS 
Reduced depreciation 
allowances 
Tax Relief Act of 1997 105-34 Exogenous Deficit-driven Permanent  Harmonized asset lives 
for alternative 
minimum tax with 
regular tax lives 
Job Creation and 
Worker Assistance Act 
of 2002 
107-147 Endogenous Countercyclical Temporary  30% bonus depreciation 
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Law Name Public Law 
Romer and 
Romer (2009) 
Classification 
Motivation Intended Duration 
Investment Tax 
Credit 
Depreciation 
Allowance 
Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2003 
108–27 Endogenous Countercyclical Temporary  Extended bonus 
depreciation 
50% for given asset 
classes 
The Economic 
Stimulus Act of 2008 
110–185 Endogenous Countercyclical Temporary  Reintroduced 50% bonus 
depreciation 
American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009 
111-5 Endogenous Countercyclical Temporary  Extended 50% bonus 
depreciation 
Small Business Jobs 
Act of 2010 
111-240 Endogenous Countercyclical Temporary  Extended 50% bonus 
depreciation 
Tax Relief, 
Unemployment 
Insurance 
Reauthorization, Job 
Creation Act of 2010 
111-312 Endogenous Countercyclical Temporary  Extended and increased 
bonus depreciation to 
100%  
The American 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 
2012 
112–240 Endogenous Countercyclical Temporary  Extended and reduced 
bonus depreciation to 
50%  
The Tax Increase 
Prevention Act of 2014 
113-295 Endogenous Countercyclical Temporary  Extended 50% bonus 
depreciation 
Notes.  The legislative history from 1954–2003 comes from Romer and Romer (2009), who labeled each law as “exogenous” or “endogenous,”  and attributed its 
motivation to one of three cateogries: long-run, countercyclical or deficit-driven.  In this context, exogeneity should not be understood in the strict sense of the 
term, but rather as describing laws that were not motivated by the contemporaneous state of the economy.  The classification reported in this table pertains 
specifically to investment subsidies and in some cases differs from the general motivations of the main legislative act.  We augmented the effects of each law on 
the ITC and depreciation allowances with information from Gravelle (1994).  We extended the Romer and Romer narrative history with legislation affecting 
investment subsidies between 2003 and 2015. 
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TABLE 2.2. EFFECTS OF INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES: EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION AND PURCHASES 
 Specification 
 
Constant and linear 
trend 
Macro covariates except 
OIL Macro covariates 
Macro covariates with 
leads and lags 
     
COMPREHENSIVE SUBSIDY     
Production 1.09  0.78  1.11  1.04  
 (0.35) (0.26) (0.32) (0.40) 
     
Purchases 1.90  1.26  1.93  1.70  
 (0.43) (0.34) (0.37) (0.45) 
     
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT     
Production 2.09  1.02  2.12  2.66  
 (0.50) (0.42) (0.45) (0.52) 
     
Purchases 2.94  1.69  2.97  3.02  
 (0.64) (0.56) (0.56) (0.65) 
     
JORGENSONIAN TAX TERM     
Production 1.08  0.54  1.08  1.02  
 (0.32) (0.25) (0.30) (0.36) 
     
Purchases 1.41  0.59  1.41  1.04  
 (0.42) (0.30) (0.40) (0.48) 
          
Notes.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of equipment production or equipment purchases as indicated.  The coefficients are for the measure of 
the subsidy (in levels).  Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2.3. EFFECTS OF INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES: EQUIPMENT PRICES 
  Specification 
 
Constant and linear 
trend 
Macro covariates except 
OIL Macro covariates 
Macro covariates with 
leads and lags 
COMPREHENSIVE SUBSIDY     
Production prices -0.12  -0.02  -0.01  0.08  
 (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
     
Purchase prices -0.34  -0.15  -0.15  -0.04  
 (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
     
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT     
Production prices 0.02  -0.11  -0.11  0.14  
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.13) 
     
Purchase prices -0.20  -0.20  -0.24  -0.08  
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.09) (0.14) 
     
JORGENSONIAN TAX TERM     
Production prices 0.06  -0.05  -0.04  0.06  
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
     
Purchase prices 0.02  -0.04  -0.03  0.04  
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
          
Notes.  Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2.4. EFFECTS OF INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES: EQUIPMENT EMPLOYMENT 
  Specification 
 
Constant and linear 
trend 
Macro covariates except 
OIL Macro covariates 
Macro covariates with 
leads and lags 
COMPREHENSIVE SUBSIDY     
Production employees 0.99  0.36  1.03  0.73  
 (0.60) (0.28) (0.61) (0.61) 
Production hours 0.76  0.34  0.80  0.63  
 (0.59) (0.30) (0.58) (0.61) 
Production wages 1.29  0.70  1.37  0.15  
 (1.23) (0.23) (1.23) (1.11) 
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT     
Production employees 2.24  0.77  2.29  2.79  
 (0.68) (0.46) (0.66) (0.83) 
Production hours 1.92  0.67  1.98  2.65  
 (0.69) (0.49) (0.65) (0.80) 
Production wages 3.64  1.04  3.75  3.85  
 (0.94) (0.37) (0.92) (1.48) 
JORGENSONIAN TAX TERM     
Production employees 1.16  0.26  1.17  1.07  
 (0.43) (0.24) (0.44) (0.53) 
     
Production hours 1.03  0.18  1.05  1.06  
 (0.42) (0.24) (0.42) (0.50) 
     
Production wages 2.12  0.38  2.16  1.85  
 (0.55) (0.22) (0.57) (0.81) 
          
Notes.  Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2.5. EFFECTS OF INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES: EQUIPMENT, OTHER VARIABLES 
  Specification 
 
Constant and linear 
trend 
Macro covariates except 
OIL Macro covariates 
Macro covariates with 
leads and lags 
COMPREHENSIVE SUBSIDY     
TFP 0.32  0.14  0.31  0.27  
 (0.17) (0.12) (0.16) (0.18) 
Cost of materials 0.86  0.62  0.91  0.78  
 (0.58) (0.35) (0.55) (0.56) 
Cost of energy 2.23  1.36  2.31  0.28  
 (1.42) (0.31) (1.39) (1.23) 
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT     
TFP 0.58  0.27  0.57  0.69  
 (0.25) (0.18) (0.22) (0.25) 
Cost of materials 1.93  1.04  2.01  2.69  
 (0.69) (0.54) (0.62) (0.76) 
Cost of energy 5.01  2.04  5.11  3.98  
 (1.06) (0.50) (1.00) (1.51) 
JORGENSONIAN TAX TERM     
TFP 0.32  0.12  0.32  0.30  
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) 
Cost of materials 1.03  0.48  1.06  1.04  
 (0.40) (0.29) (0.39) (0.47) 
Cost of energy 2.78  0.92  2.84  1.92  
 (0.69) (0.35) (0.67) (0.78) 
          
Notes:  Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2.6. EFFECTS OF INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES: STRUCTURES PRODUCTION AND PRICES 
  Specification 
 
Constant and linear 
trend 
Macro covariates except 
OIL Macro covariates 
Macro covariates with 
leads and lags 
     
COMPREHENSIVE SUBSIDY     
Purchases 0.88  1.00  1.06  0.46  
 (0.31) (0.23) (0.32) (0.31) 
     
Prices 0.53  0.33  0.58  0.36  
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.13) (0.12) 
     
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT     
Purchases 4.73  3.83  4.82  3.97  
 (0.59) (0.59) (0.53) (0.76) 
     
Prices 0.73  1.10  0.73  -0.68  
 (0.20) (0.13) (0.20) (0.35) 
  -   
JORGENSONIAN TAX TERM     
Purchases 0.44  0.21  0.62  0.28  
 (0.27) (0.20) (0.29) (0.26) 
     
Prices -0.04  0.02  -0.01  -0.07  
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
          
Notes.  Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2.7. INDIRECT INFERENCE ESTIMATES AND COMPARISON  
 
Adjustment Cost Calibration Low Medium High
Capital Adjustment Cost (ξ n ) 3.30 10.00 20.00
Labor Adjustment Cost (ξ h ) 0.00 0.10 0.30
Parameter Estimates
Import Supply Elasticity (χ ) 3.55 2.55 1.95
(0.39) (0.35) (0.34)
Production Elasticity of Effort (θ ) 0.65 0.63 0.66
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Type Specific Labor Substitution (ψ n ) 2.23 2.52 2.25
(0.49) (0.55) (0.48)
Variable Reduced Form Coefficient
Equipment Production 1.11 0.76 0.72 0.74
(0.32)
Equipment Investment 1.93 1.51 1.54 1.54
(0.37)
Hours 0.80 0.37 0.38 0.45
(0.58)
Wage Bill 1.37 1.15 1.29 1.45
(1.23)
Material Inputs 0.91 0.77 0.72 0.75
(0.55)
Productivity (TFP) 0.31 0.07 0.08 0.10
(0.16)
Structures Investment 1.06 2.17 2.02 1.90
(0.32)
Effort 0.82 0.98 1.10
Capital 0.29 0.23 0.16
Model Coefficient
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TABLE 2.8. EQUIPMENT TYPES:  DEPRECIATION RATES, INVESTMENT SHARES AND SUBSIDIES 
 Depreciation 
( ) 
Investment Share 
(1990–2009)  
Average 
Subsidy 
Computers, software and office equipment 0.30 15.50% 0.40 
Communication equipment 0.13 5.64% 0.38 
Instruments 0.14 3.99% 0.39 
Photocopy and related equipment 0.18 0.82% 0.40 
Fabricated metal products 0.09 0.92% 0.39 
Steam engines 0.05 0.31% 0.35 
Internal combustion engines 0.21 0.14% 0.35 
Metalworking machinery 0.12 1.81% 0.39 
Industrial Equipment 0.11 5.51% 0.39 
Electrical transmission and distribution 0.05 1.51% 0.38 
Trucks, buses, and truck trailers 0.19 4.44% 0.40 
Autos 0.17 2.84% 0.40 
Aircraft 0.11 1.46% 0.40 
Ships and boats 0.06 0.23% 0.37 
Railroad equipment 0.06 0.41% 0.38 
Household furniture 0.14 0.14% 0.40 
Other furniture 0.12 2.16% 0.40 
Farm tractors 0.15 0.42% 0.39 
Other agricultural machinery 0.12 0.82% 0.39 
Construction tractors 0.16 0.15% 0.40 
Other construction machinery 0.16 1.32% 0.40 
Mining and oilfield machinery 0.15 0.40% 0.40 
Service industry machinery 0.17 1.29% 0.40 
Household appliances and miscellaneous 0.18 0.31% 0.40 
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TABLE 2.9. STRUCTURES TYPES:  DEPRECIATION RATES, INVESTMENT SHARES AND SUBSIDIES 
 Depreciation 
(d) 
Investment Share 
(1990–2009)  
Average 
Subsidy 
Hospitals, medical, religious and educational 
structures 0.02 2.91% 0.23 
Commercial structures 0.02 2.75% 0.30 
Warehouses 0.02 0.76% 0.23 
Manufacturing 0.03 2.62% 0.26 
Electric 0.02 1.63% 0.31 
Other power, petroleum and natural gas 0.02 2.95% 0.31 
Communication 0.02 1.10% 0.32 
Mining 0.07 0.18% 0.39 
Railroads 0.03 0.37% 0.25 
Farm structures 0.02 0.33% 0.29 
Residential structures 0.02 31.89% 0.26 
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FIGURE 2.1. PURCHASES, PRODUCTION AND PRICES, GENERAL INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT 
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FIGURE 2.2.  INVESTMENT SUBSIDY, GENERAL INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT 
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FIGURE 2.3. COMPREHENSIVE SUBSIDY BY INVESTMENT TYPE 
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FIGURE 2.4. REACTION TO A 10 PERCENT PERMANENT INVESTMENT SUBSIDY FOR EQUIPMENT 
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FIGURE 2.5. REACTION TO A 10 PERCENT PERMANENT INVESTMENT SUBSIDY FOR EQUIPMENT, CLOSED ECONOMY 
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FIGURE 2.6. REACTION TO A 10 PERCENT TEMPORARY INVESTMENT SUBSIDY FOR EQUIPMENT 
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FIGURE 2.7. REACTION TO A 10 PERCENT PERMANENT INVESTMENT SUBSIDY TO EQUIPMENT, CROSS SECTION 
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APPENDIX 2.A 
COMPARISON WITH GOOLSBEE (1998) 
Goolsbee (1998) is one of the most influential studies of the effects of investment tax incentives 
on the market for capital goods.  The main finding of Goolsbee’s paper is that investment subsidies 
increase equipment prices and benefit not only firms that invest, but also capital suppliers.  This 
result was robust to alternative specifications, and was present in two distinct datasets – investment 
price deflators from the BEA, and equipment output deflators from the NBER Manufacturing 
Industry Database.  Furthermore, Goolsbee estimated investment supply elasticities, finding 
evidence in favor of upward sloping supply curves for equipment goods. If the supply of new 
capital is price inelastic, economic theory predicts that investment tax incentives have little effect 
on investment demand, and instead succeed only in driving up equipment prices. 
 In contrast, we find that investment tax incentives do not have a clear effect on investment 
goods prices, and that investment demand strongly responds to subsidies.  Under our preferred 
specification, a one percent subsidy increases equipment investment by roughly 2 percent, 
investment production by 1.25 percent, and structures investment by one.  The reduced-form 
analysis in our study is closely related to Goolsbee’s work – we set out to measure many of the 
same relationships, and our empirical specifications are inspired by those in Goolsbee (1998).  In 
this appendix, we attempt to meticulously reconstruct the methodology and data used by Goolsbee 
at the time when he published his paper.  We consider differences in specification, data revisions, 
and differences in the time period included in each of the two studies, and we demonstrate that 
restatements in price deflators are the likely reason our findings depart from Goolsbee’s.  The 
replication allows us to approximately reproduce Gooslbee’s main findings.  The main differences 
are primarily due to differences in sample periods, but also from differences in econometric 
specification. 
 Starting with the data and covariates in Section 2.3, we vary the empirical model by 
incrementally changing different features of the specification. Each variant brings us closer to the 
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empirical model in Goolsbee’s paper.  The results are reported in Table 2.A.1.  Our baseline 
specification, presented in column (1), is a pooled regression of the log real relative investment 
prices on a constant, linear trend (allowing for a trend break), investment tax incentives, HP-
filtered GDP, dummies for the Nixon price controls and real oil prices.  Real prices are calculated 
using the deflator for nondurable personal consumption expenditures.  The data cover the period 
from 1959–2009.  This specification closely resembles that used for our main estimates, the only 
differences being that we use annual instead of quarterly data, and we align the equipment types 
to those present in the BEA dataset used by Goolsbee (1998).  As for our main estimates, we 
consider three measures of investment subsidies: the Jorgensonian tax term, the investment tax 
credit, and the comprehensive investment subsidy.  Our pooled estimates of the effect of tax 
incentives on investment prices are not statistically significant.  
 This result is robust to changing the time period to 1959–1997, as shown in column (2), as 
well as to modifying the specification to match the covariates in Goolsbee’s paper, more 
specifically a constant term, linear trend (without a trend break), the growth rate of GDP, dummies 
for the Nixon price controls and the real exchange rates of U.S. dollars to German marks and 
Japanese yen.  The latter set of estimates, reported in column (5), include both an OLS regression 
and a regression with quasi-differenced data to remove serial correlation in the variables, as in 
Goolsbee (1998).  None of these estimates indicate that investment subsidies drive up the prices 
of equipment goods. 
 Our last variant, presented in column (4), regresses vintage BEA data on investment prices 
and other macroeconomic variables that was available at the time of Goolsbee’s analysis. The data 
were published by the U.S. Department of Commerce in a volume called Fixed Reproducible 
Tangible Wealth in the United States: 1925–1989.  These last estimates are statistically significant 
and show a positive relationships between investment subsidies and equipment prices.  The results 
are qualitatively similar to those in Goolsbee’s paper, which are reproduced in column (5).  Taken 
as a whole, the variants summarized in Table 2.A.1 strongly suggest that restatements of equipment 
prices account for the fact that, unlike Goolsbee, we no longer find evidence that investment tax 
incentives affect prices. 
 It is not surprising that data revisions are so material that they yield different conclusions.  
Equipment prices are notoriously subject to measurement error due to dramatic quality 
improvements in capital goods.  As described in the N.I.P.A. Handbook (2014), the times series 
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for equipment prices are compiled from multiple sources, primarily BLS PPI and CPI series. 
Figure 2.A.1 presents the vintage and current real prices of equipment, showing that for many 
series data revisions are indeed substantial. 
 Although we have replicated the qualitative results in Goolsbee’s paper, our estimates are 
not numerically identical.  We note two factors that likely contribute to this difference.  First, we 
were not able to obtain vintage data for investment subsidies, nor for the German and Japanese 
price indices we used to calculate real exchange rates.  Second, our implementation of the AR(2) 
quasi-differencing procedure used to address serial correlation may differ from that in Goolsbee’s 
paper. The algorithm relies on numerical convergence, and we have verified that the choice of 
stopping criteria can affect estimates.
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TABLE 2.A.1. COMPARISON WITH GOOLSBEE (1998) 
 
Notes.  OLS standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The notation in column headings represents the covariates in each specification as follows: “1” for the 
constant term; “t” for a linear trend without trend break; “t1 t2” for a linear term allowing a trend break; “hpY” for HP-filtered GDP; “NIX” for Nixon price controls 
dummies; “OIL” for real oil prices; “gY” for the growth rate of GDP; “DM” for the real exchange rate between U.S. dollars and German marks; “YEN” for the 
real exchange rate between U.S. Dollars and Japanese yen.  We apply quasi-differencing for AR(2) serial correlation only to specifications that do not contain a 
trend break.
(5)
Goolsbee
(1998)
OLS
Quasi
Diff OLS
Quasi
Diff OLS
Quasi
Diff OLS
Quasi
Diff
Quasi
Diff
-0.788 N.A. -0.074 N.A. -1.029 -0.265 0.501 0.280 N.A.
(0.246) (0.238) (0.389) (0.231) (0.110) (0.061)
-0.242 N.A. 0.122 N.A. -1.070 -0.284 0.551 0.177 0.390
(0.360) (0.342) (0.457) (0.269) (0.129) (0.074) (0.036)
-0.045 N.A. 0.109 N.A. -0.445 0.041 0.263 0.133 0.170
(0.185) (0.148) (0.262) (0.144) (0.075) (0.042) (0.028)
(4)(3)(2)(1)
Vintage DataCurrent DataCurrent DataCurrent Data
1 t gY Nix DM Yen1 t gY Nix DM Yen1 t1 t2 hpY Nix Oil1 t1 t2 hpY Nix Oil
INVESTMENT TAX 
CREDIT
COMPREHENSIVE 
INVESTMENT 
SUBSIDY
1959-19881959-19881959-19881959-2009
JORGENSONIAN TAX 
TERM
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FIGURE 2.A.1. VINTAGE AND CURRENT EQUIPMENT PRICES, ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE 
 
-- Vintage Prices  – Current  Price
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APPENDIX 2.B 
EFFECTS OF INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES ON EQUIPMENT TRADE 
In this appendix, we present evidence on the effects of investment tax incentives on the imports 
and exports of equipment.  A comprehensive study of investment subsidies would ideally describe 
their effects not only on the production and business investment in capital goods, but on all 
components of the capital accounting identity 
 Y I C G IMP EXP       (1) 
where Y  denotes the domestic output of capital goods, I  is investment, C  is private consumption 
of capital goods, G  is government purchases, IMP  is imports and EXP  is exports of capital 
goods.  For all types of equipment, trade is substantial, while for a subset of types, such as autos, 
private and government consumption are also considerable.  As an example, the top panel of Figure 
2.1 shows the gap between domestic production and purchases of general industrial equipment. 
Investment tax incentives are often offered with the goal to stimulate the economy.  
Understanding if increased investment comes at the cost of crowding out purchases of capital 
goods by households and the government is therefore important for evaluating the effects of 
investment subsidies.  Similarly, the stimulus effect of subsidies is subject to “leakage” through 
international trade and can potentially benefit not only domestic, but also foreign producers of 
capital goods. 
 Data availability has limited our ability to study the general-equilibrium effects of 
investment on all aspects of economic activity.  To the best of our knowledge, data on consumption 
and government purchases of capital goods at the level of aggregation in the BEA detail tables do 
not exist.  We compiled an annual dataset of equipment imports and exports that partially aligns 
with the capital types studied in our main analysis, for the time period from 1959–1994.  Data on 
the imports and exports of capital goods were assembled from the NBER database on U.S. imports 
and exports by four-digit SIC industry.  We mapped these data to 1987 SIC using the concordance 
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table in Bartelsman and Gray (1996),  then retained only data for 1987 SIC codes that could be 
matched unequivocally to six-digit NAICS codes based on the concordance table published by the 
Census Bureau.  We then followed the same procedure as for the production data to aggregate to 
the equipment types in the BEA detail tables, however some of the NAICS codes in the production 
data were not present in the resulting trade data, so the mapping of trade to our main production, 
purchases and subsidies series is only partially complete.  After 1994, international trade data is 
available only under the Harmonized System product nomenclature, which is not compatible with 
NAICS.  As a result, we were not able to extend the equipment exports and imports data by BEA 
investment types beyond 1994. 
 We present two sets of empirical results using the same specifications described in Section 
2.4.1.  In table 2.B.1, we show pooled estimates of the effects of investment subsidies on imports 
and exports for all equipment types.  In table 2.B.2, we restrict the dataset to the equipment types 
for which we captured all underlying NAICS codes that make up the corresponding BEA 
definitions, thus the trade data is aligned with the other series in our data, most importantly with 
investment subsidies.  We find that equipment imports respond sharply to investment tax 
incentives.  An investment subsidy of 1 percent is associated with an increase of roughly 2 to 3 
percent in equipment imports.  These estimates suggest that when subsidies are offered, increased 
investment demand is partially met through imports, thus investment tax incentives “leak” to 
foreign capital producers.  Interestingly, we find that exports also increase when investment 
subsidies are high, although less sharply than imports.  The exports results are somewhat less 
conclusive as many estimates are not statistically significant, in particular when all types are 
included in the regression.  Overall, the evidence suggests that domestic producers of capital goods 
benefit from investment subsidies through two separate channels: higher domestic demand for 
their output, as well as an incentive to invest themselves, increasing production and exports. 
 The quantitative model in Section 2.5 is consistent with the empirical evidence on 
equipment trade.  In the model, as in the data, net imports of equipment sharply increase following 
a positive investment subsidy shock.  However, we do not use the imports and exports estimates 
in the indirect inference procedure to calibrate the model.  Due to the shortcomings in the trade 
data described above, the imports and exports results are not directly comparable with the main 
estimates in Section 2.4.2.  Additionally, the model abstracts from private and government 
consumption of capital goods, which introduces another source of inconsistency with the data. 
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TABLE 2.B.1. EFFECTS OF INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES: EQUIPMENT IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, ALL TYPES 
  Specification 
 
Constant and 
linear trend 
Macro covariates 
except OIL Macro covariates 
Macro covariates 
with leads and 
lags 
     
COMPREHENSIVE SUBSIDY     
Imports 2.95  2.87  3.13  2.05  
 (0.96) (0.84) (0.95) (0.75) 
     
Exports 1.35  0.83  -0.37  -0.68  
 (0.91) (0.71) (0.73) (0.51) 
     
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT     
Imports 3.36  3.31  3.32  0.79  
 (1.44) (1.35) (1.64) (0.94) 
     
Exports 2.10  2.02  0.11  -0.41  
 (0.95) (0.96) (1.02) (0.67) 
     
JORGENSONIAN TAX TERM     
Imports 1.50  1.43  0.70  -0.11  
 (1.00) (1.02) (1.10) (0.60) 
     
Exports 0.84  0.80  0.11  -0.08  
 (0.39) (0.40) (0.28) (0.26) 
          
Notes.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of equipment imports or equipment exports as indicated.  The coefficients are for the measure 
of the subsidy (in levels).  Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
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TABLE 2.B.2. EFFECTS OF INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES: EQUIPMENT IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, SELECTED TYPES 
  Specification 
 Constant and linear trend 
Macro covariates 
except OIL Macro covariates 
Macro covariates 
with leads and 
lags 
     
COMPREHENSIVE SUBSIDY     
Imports 3.27  3.31  3.26  1.80  
 (0.94) (0.84) (1.08) (1.34) 
     
Exports 1.88  1.82  0.45  1.37  
 (0.96) (1.02) (1.05) (0.93) 
     
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT     
Imports 3.76  3.89  3.41  0.20  
 (1.46) (1.36) (1.97) (1.20) 
     
Exports 2.94  2.86  1.25  0.79  
 (1.18) (1.24) (1.50) (0.98) 
     
JORGENSONIAN TAX TERM     
Imports 1.64  1.68  0.50  -0.97  
 (1.11) (1.15) (1.23) (0.71) 
     
Exports 1.84  1.79  0.85  0.52  
 (0.66) (0.71) (0.47) (0.38) 
          
Notes.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of equipment imports or equipment exports as indicated.  The coefficients are for the measure 
of the subsidy (in levels).  The equipment types included in these results are: metalworking machinery; electrical transmission and distribution; mining 
and oilfield machinery.  Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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CHAPTER III 
INVESTMENT TIMING IN FIXED-COST MODELS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Most investment models imply that firms are willing to sharply change the timing of their 
investment decisions to take advantage of small predictable movements in the after-tax purchase 
price of new capital.  In many settings, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for investment 
is nearly infinite.  This extreme sensitivity to price changes implies that, in equilibrium, there 
cannot be substantial predictable changes in investment prices.  If prices were expected to fall, 
firms would simply delay their investment to take advantage of the lower prices.  A high 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for investment also implies that the distribution of capital 
holdings across firms will not affect equilibrium investment.  If many firms with outdated capital 
want to invest, investment demand will be high and there will be upward pressure on prices.  
Because of the near-infinite elasticity of investment demand, any price increase will sharply reduce 
equilibrium investment.  Firms that would otherwise adjust, instead delay their investment to avoid 
the temporarily high prices.  Thus, because of the extreme price-sensitivity of investment timing, 
variations in the distribution of capital holdings across firms play no role in governing the 
equilibrium. 
In this study, we develop an equilibrium model of investment in which firms face explicit 
costs to adjusting the timing of their investment purchases.  We do not explicitly consider the 
source of these costs.  The investment retiming costs could reflect planning costs, costs associated 
with predictable rapid depreciation, complementarity with other predetermined factors of 
production, or behavioral costs associated with constantly tracking investment prices.  If these 
retiming costs are sufficiently high, firms will not retime their investment to take advantage of 
predictable changes in investment prices and thus, forecastable price changes may exist in 
equilibrium. 
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In the model, firms also face fixed investment adjustment costs.  As a consequence, firms 
make infrequent, large adjustments to their capital stocks.  Not all firms adjust their capital at the 
same time and thus not all firms have the same capital stocks.  At any point in time, some firms 
that have adjusted recently have new capital, while other firms that have not adjusted for some 
time have relatively outdated capital.  The distribution of capital holdings across firms evolves 
over time as the market for investment goods experiences shocks to supply and demand.  As 
discussed above, if there are no costs to retiming investment, this distribution has no impact on the 
equilibrium, as in House (2014), Thomas (2002), Khan and Thomas (2004, 2008).  If, on the other 
hand, there are costs to retiming investment, then the distribution may influence the equilibrium 
price and quantity of investment.  If investment demand is unusually high because many firms 
have outdated capital, then investment prices can be high without causing many firms to adjust the 
timing of their capital investments. 
The investment model we present nests two special cases.  If there are no costs to retiming 
investment, the model collapses to a standard investment model with fixed adjustment costs.  
Earlier literature shows that at the aggregate level, equilibrium investment models with fixed costs 
behave virtually the same as standard neoclassical investment models—see among others, House 
(2014), Thomas (2002), Khan and Thomas (2004, 2008).  If investment retiming costs approach 
infinity, the model reduces to an (s,S) adjustment model of the sort analyzed in the literature on 
lumpy adjustment.  If there is an intermediate level of investment retiming costs, equilibrium price 
and quantity movements will reflect an elasticity of investment demand which is bounded away 
from zero and infinity. 
The potential implications of lumpy-investment behavior at the micro-level have been a 
focus of much of the recent research on investment.  Many of the recent contributions to this 
literature have focused on numerical solutions to particular calibrated models.  These models 
largely consist of a fixed-adjustment-cost framework built on an underlying neoclassical 
substructure.  For the most part these numerical explorations suggest that the influence of lumpy 
investment on aggregate investment dynamics is negligible.  Put differently, in the numerical trials 
one would get essentially the same aggregate predictions from a standard neoclassical investment 
model as from the more elaborate investment models with micro-level heterogeneity and 
infrequent lumpy adjustment.  These studies have led some researchers to conclude that lumpy 
adjustment simply does not matter for understanding aggregate investment.   
65 
This study draws attention to an underappreciated property of the neoclassical model on 
which the lumpy-investment models are built.  Namely, in neoclassical models, firms have 
extremely high intertemporal price elasticities of investment demand.  Thus, the investment 
dynamics associated with micro-heterogeneity and infrequent investment may be suppressed 
because the firms are simply too eager to change the timing of their investments in response to 
predictable price movements.  In a sense, the existing models with fixed costs are examining a 
joint null in which there is both lumpy investment and the firms are extraordinarily price sensitive.  
In this study we modify the lumpy-investment model to temper the firms’ incentives to retime 
investment.  We show that in our modified setting, distributional dynamics associated with micro-
level heterogeneity do emerge as a quantitatively important state variable and there are clear 
differences in the behavior of the lumpy-investment model and the neoclassical model. 
The retiming costs we study in this study are conceptually similar to the “gestation lags” 
in Millar (2005).  In his paper, Millar argued that typical adjustment cost models fail to stand the 
test of Tobin’s Q regressions precisely because they abstract from planning and setup time required 
before new investment can become productive capital.  If such lags exist in the data, future Q 
rather than current Q determines current investment. Millar found that reduced-form estimates 
using aggregate investment and Tobin’s Q data are consistent with a simple investment model with 
gestation lags. Unlike Millar, we use our investment model with retiming costs to simulate the 
behavior of investment in response to various shocks, and describe the implications of planning 
frictions for fiscal stimulus. 
The remainder of the chapter is set out as follows.  Section 3.2 describes the model.  Section 
3.3 presents numerical experiments and discusses their implications.  Section 3.4 concludes. 
3.2. QUANTITATIVE MODEL 
We consider a partial equilibrium investment supply and demand model.  The model is based 
loosely on the framework in Caplin and Leahy (2004, 2006).  In addition to standard fixed costs, 
firms in this model also face an additional of friction, a cost to changing the timing of their 
investment decisions.  We then use the model to illustrate the behavior of the system under 
different parameterizations and we analyze the implications of retiming costs for investment tax 
policy. 
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The supply side of the model consists of an isoelastic supply curve which experiences 
shocks over time.  The demand side consists of a fixed population of firms that infrequently update 
their capital stock due to a fixed cost.  The firms choose when to update based on the current after-
tax price of capital goods and the realization of a productivity shock.  The firms also pay a cost to 
deviating from their steady state adjustment pattern.  If this cost is zero, then the model is identical 
to the state dependent (s,S) model in Thomas (2002), Gourio and Kashyap (2007) and House 
(2014).  In this case, firms are extremely willing to change the timing of their investment decisions 
to take advantage of predictable movements in after-tax prices of capital goods.  This high 
elasticity of demand dictates that after-tax prices should be close to a random walk.  In contrast, 
with substantial costs of retiming investment, firms do not react as sharply to anticipated changes 
in capital goods prices.  As a result, the after-tax price of capital may exhibit some predictability.  
As the costs of retiming investment approach infinity, the model collapses to the fixed (s,S) model 
in Caballero and Engel (1999) and Caplin and Leahy (2004).  In this study, we focus on describing 
the implications of the model for investment dynamics and tax policies that stimulate investment. 
The quantitative model is cast in discrete time with time intervals of size  .  Firms 
discount the future at the annual rate r  and capital depreciates at the annual rate  .  Given the 
time interval  , the discount factor is re    and the depreciation rate satisfies  1 e     . 
Flow profits are t tAZ k
 , where tk  is capital at the firm-level, 0 1  , A is a scaling 
constant, and tZ  is a productivity shock to the value-added production function; we assume that 
this shock is common to all firms.  When a firm adjusts its capital stock it incurs two costs.
 The first cost is a stochastic adjustment cost , 0i t  , which is incurred only when firm-
level investment is non-zero.  To model the adjustment cost, we follow Thomas (2002) and assume 
that firms draw idiosyncratic costs of adjustment each period.  Thus, instead of facing a known 
fixed cost F each period, firm i faces the stochastic cost ,i t , where  ,i t  ,     ,i tE F , 
 
,
0
i t
 and ,i t  is i.i.d. across time periods and across firms.  The stochastic adjustment cost 
implies that firm-level investment is lumpy, but aggregate investment is relatively smooth.  For 
the numerical solution, we assume that ,i t  is a mixture of a log-normal random variable and a 
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wide uniform.14 
The second cost is a cost per unit of investment * ,(1 )      t t t j tp k k , where tp  is the pre-
tax price of new investment, t  is an investment tax subsidy at time t, *tk  is the reset capital stock 
chosen by the firm and ,j tk  is the current capital stock.  The index j denotes the age or vintage of 
the firm’s capital stock.   
If the firm does not adjust, its capital stock depreciates according to  1, 1 ,1   j t j tk k .  
For tractability, we assume that firms may not delay updating their capital stock longer than J 
periods.  As a result, there are J possible capital vintages 1,...,j J .  The oldest possible vintage 
is vintage J.  In practice, we set J to be sufficiently large such that this limit is not binding for any 
reasonable set of parameter values. 
The central feature of the model is a third friction, a retiming cost incurred when the firm 
changes its adjustment policy relative to its normal (steady-state) adjustment rule.  We describe 
these retiming costs in detail after we introduce additional concepts below. 
Steady State.  In the steady state, there are no productivity shocks and no investment supply shocks, 
and capital goods prices are constant.  As a result, firms invest at the same regular time interval 
and always reset their capital stocks to the same level.  Let T denote the steady state adjustment 
horizon (in years) and let *k  be the steady state reset level of capital.  This lumpy firm-level 
investment pattern arises from the stochastic costs incurred when firms adjust their capital stock.  
Absent adjustment costs, firms would invest every period and maintain a constant capital stock of 
k = 1.15 
Investment Adjustment.  In each time period, the firm decides whether to adjust its capital stock 
and pay the adjustment cost 
,i t
 .  The stochastic nature of the cost implies that some firms adjust 
even if they are far from the steady-state adjustment horizon T.  Consider a firm with capital stock 
,j t
k of vintage j at time t.  We define ,
adj
j tV  as the value of adjusting the capital stock for this firm, 
                                                          
14 The numerical method was developed jointly by Robert King, Julia Thomas and Marcelo Veracierto.  For examples 
see Dotsey, King and Wohlman (1999), Thomas (2002), Veracierto (2002), King and Thomas (2006) and Gourio and 
Kashyap (2007). 
15 We normalize the steady state price p and the steady state level of productivity Z to 1.  We set the scaling parameter 
as   1   A r . 
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and ,
non
j tV  the value of not adjusting.  As the firm chooses optimally between these two options, we 
can write the firm’s value as  
    , , , , ,max ,adj nonj t i t j t i t j tV V V   . (1) 
Prior to the realization of the adjustment cost 
,i t
 , the expected value of having capital stock of 
vintage j at time t is 
    , ,0

   j t j tv V d   (2) 
The value of not adjusting is then 
 , , 1, 1
non
j t t j t t j tV AZ k E v
          , (3) 
in other words the firm derives flow profits from its current vintage j capital stock 
*
,
(1 )j
j t t j
k k   , and receives the expected continuation value of having capital stock 

    
1 *
1, 1
(1 )j
j t t j
k k  of vintage j+1 in the following time period. 
 The value of adjusting (once the firm has paid the stochastic adjustment cost) is 
       * * *, 1, 1 ,max 1 1
t
adj
j t t t t t t t t t t j t
k
V AZ k E v p k p k

           . (4) 
In this case, the firm pays the per unit cost associated with adjusting its capital stock from its 
current level 
,j t
k  to the optimal reset level *
t
k  and receives the continuation value of having capital 
stock    
*
1, 1
(1 )
t t
k k  of vintage one in the following time period.  Firms with capital vintage J 
must adjust and they pay F with certainty.  The value of having capital of vintage J is thus 
 , , ,
adj
J t J t J tv V V F   . (5) 
The values ,j tv  and ,j tV  are functions of the reset capital stock at time t j , 
*
t j
k .  The optimal 
reset capital stock is not vintage specific, so every firm that adjusts its capital stock at time t makes 
the same choice *tk .  The optimal capital stock satisfies the first order condition 
    1 1, 1* * 1tt t t t t
t
v
AZ k E p
k

  
 
       
, (6) 
which simply says that the shadow value of an additional unit of capital at time t must be equal to 
its after-tax marginal cost.   
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Equilibrium Adjustment Policy.  Firms follow a one-sided (s,S) investment rule characterized by a 
cutoff adjustment cost, denoted 
,jˆ t
.  If the realization of the adjustment cost is below the cutoff, 
the firm adjusts its capital stock and pays the adjustment cost.  On the other hand, if the realization 
of the cost is above the cutoff, the firm does not adjust.  The cutoff is a function of the firm’s 
capital stock and of aggregate state variables, including the productivity shock and investment 
supply shock.  Together with the distribution of the shocks, the cutoff determines the fraction of 
firms that adjust in each period. 
Investment Retiming Costs.  In this study, we introduce a new type of friction that has not been 
previously studied in the investment literature.  More specifically, firms incur a cost when their 
adjustment policy differs from their steady state adjustment pattern.  This investment retiming cost 
captures time to plan and build required before the actual investment occurs. If firms set their plans 
before observed investment expenditures, they are less willing to change their planned investment 
in response to shocks.  An alternative interpretation is that monitoring markets to learn the current 
values of state variables entails cognitive costs.  We model this planning friction by assuming that 
firms incur costs whenever they alter the cutoffs ,ˆ j t  relative to their steady state values ˆ j
.Mechanically, if a firm wants to adjust early or late, it must change the cutoff shock ,ˆj t  that 
characterizes its (s,S) investment rule.  We assume retiming costs take the form 
  2,ˆ ˆ2 
  j t j , (7) 
where the parameter   determines the magnitude of the costs.  The firm incurs retiming costs even 
if it does not adjust its capital stock. 
To understand how retiming costs affect the firm’s decision, consider the expected value 
of a firm with capital of vintage j at time t prior to the realization of the stochastic adjustment cost.  
Specifically, the value ,j tv  satisfies 
      ,
, ,
ˆ 2
, , , ,ˆ ˆ0
ˆ ˆmax
2

 
    
                 
j t
j t j t
adj non
j t j t j t j t jv V d V d . (8) 
If 0   then there are no costs to deviating from the steady state adjustment profile.  In this case, 
the optimal cutoff adjustment cost is simply , , ,ˆ  
adj non
j t j t j tV V .  This is exactly the case considered 
by Thomas (2002).  At the other extreme, if    , then firms never deviate from their steady 
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state adjustment policy, so  
,
ˆ ˆ
j t j
.  For values of the retiming cost parameter   between zero 
and infinity, the optimal cutoff is a weighted average of the two extreme cases:  
     
          , , ,
ˆ ˆ1
1 1
adj non
j t j t j t j
V V . (9) 
When firms face retiming costs, they are less willing to deviate from their steady state 
adjustment patterns in response to changes in capital goods prices and investment subsidies.  This 
effect tempers the high elasticity of intertemporal substitution typical of conventional fixed-cost 
and neoclassical investment models.  In Section 3.3, we conduct a series of numerical experiments 
to highlight the effects of investment retiming costs on aggregate investment under an investment 
supply shock, a temporary investment subsidy, and an out-of-state distribution of firms over capital 
vintages.  We show that retiming costs generate specific patterns in aggregate investment and have 
sharp implications for investment tax policy. 
To interpret the retiming cost parameter, we express   in terms of the minimum benefit b 
the firm requires to be willing to bear the costs associated with changing the adjustment cutoff by 
F, the mean of the fixed cost distribution.  In absolute terms, the costs to the firm associated with 
this change are   22 F , so the minimum required benefit, as a fraction of firm value, is 
 
      
2
2
F
b
V
  (10) 
Aggregation.  Aggregate investment tI  is the sum of firm-level investment.  If a firm with capital 
stock j chooses to adjust, its investment is  * * 1 jt t jk k   .  Therefore, aggregate investment is  
    * *, ,
1
ˆ 1
J
j
t j t j t t t j
j
I f k k 

       , (11) 
where ,j tf  is the fraction of firms with capital stock of vintage j at time t.  The distribution of firms 
over capital vintages evolves according to  
  , 1, 1 1, 1ˆ1j t j t j tf f           (12) 
for 1 j J  .  For 0j  , we have  
  0, , ,
1
ˆ
J
t j t j t
j
f f

  . (13) 
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Investment Supply.  The supply of investment is governed by an isoelastic supply curve  
  
1
t t tp X I I   , (14) 
where   is the elasticity of investment supply, I  is steady state investment and tX  is a cost shock. 
Shocks.  The investment supply shock has a permanent component, and a transitory component, 
which is assumed to be AR(2): 
 
  

 
 
 
  
1
1 1 2 2
,
,
.
perm trans
t t t
perm perm perm
t t t
trans trans trans trans
t t t t
x x x
x x
x x x
  (15) 
The productivity shock is a random walk with drift: 
  1
z
t t t
z z . (16) 
In addition to the supply and demand shocks, the model also features investment subsidy shocks 
t , which are assumed to be temporary and unanticipated. 
3.3. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS 
We illustrate the effects of investment retiming costs by simulating the behavior of the model in 
response to three types of shocks.  We consider an investment supply shock, an investment tax 
subsidy like the one in Adda and Cooper (2000), and the equilibrium associated with an initial out-
of-steady-state distribution of firms over capital holdings.  We consider five different values of the 
investment retiming costs.  As a fraction of total firm value, these values are 0, 0.05 percent, 0.1 
percent, 0.5 percent, and one percent.  The higher values exceed the range we would expect to find 
in the data, however including these values is useful as an upper bound on the magnitude of the 
effects our model is able to generate using reasonable parameter values. 
Calibration and Solution.  To illustrate the behavior of the model, we calibrate it with a set of 
plausible initial parameter values.  We then catalogue the model’s reaction to a variety of shocks.  
We set the returns to scale parameter   to 0.9 and the investment supply elasticity   to 5, which 
is close to the estimates in House and Shapiro (2008).  The baseline depreciation rate   is 10 
percent annually. The baseline discount rate r is 2 percent annually.  A 10 percent depreciation 
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rate is similar to the depreciation rates of many types of equipment.  Cooper et al. (1999) find that 
each year, roughly one out of every five manufacturing plants experiences an “investment spike,” 
which they define as an increase in plant-level capital of at least 20 percent.16  The autoregressive 
parameters of the investment supply shocks, 
1
  and 
2
  are set to 1.6 and -0.65...  The baseline 
parameter values are summarized in Table 3.1. 
The equations governing the model are linearized around a non-stochastic steady state and 
a rational expectations equilibrium is computed with the Anderson-Moore (AIM) algorithm.  The 
remaining details of the numerical procedure are presented in Appendix 3.A. 
Supply Shock.  We consider a positive temporary innovation of one percent to the investment 
supply shock tX  in equation (14).  This shock temporarily increases the price of capital goods, but 
it does not have substantial consequences for the long-run value of investment.  The literature on 
investment supply shocks, notably Justiniani, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2011) and Schmitt-Grohe 
and Uribe (2012) interprets temporary investment supply shocks as distortions to the marginal 
efficiency of investment, for example disturbances to the financial sector to transform savings into 
future capital input, and account for most of the business cycle variation in the models considered 
by these authors. 
 Figure 3.1 shows the system’s reaction to the temporary supply shock.  The top panel shows 
the supply shock variable itself, which features a hump-shaped response to the innovation because 
it is modeled as an AR(2) process.  The middle panel shows the response of aggregate investment 
and the lower panel shows the response of the price level under the five adjustment costs 
parameters listed above. 
In the absence of retiming costs (blue line), aggregate investment sharply drops as firms 
delay adjusting their capital stocks.  In the first period, the one percent investment supply shock 
causes investment to fall by almost 5 percent and the equilibrium price of new capital goods 
changes only slightly in response to the shock. This response illustrates the high intertemporal 
elasticity of investment in conventional fixed-cost models.  If the intertemporal elasticity of 
investment demand were infinite, then the price would not change at all and there would be exactly 
a 5 percent change in the quantity of investment (recall that our calibration of the supply elasticity 
                                                          
16 Cooper et al. [1999] base their findings on data from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), which includes 
most U.S. manufacturing plants. 
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was 5.0). The actual elasticity is not infinite but it is so large that the actual equilibrium outcome 
is close to this limiting case. 
In contrast, investment retiming costs reduce the number of firms who delay adjustment in 
response to the supply shock.  The drop in aggregate investment is less pronounced as retiming 
costs increase, while prices substantially increase.  For sufficiently high investment retiming costs, 
aggregate investment increases above its steady state level in the first period as firms anticipate 
high capital goods princes in future periods. 
 Lastly, investment retiming costs also induce predictable changes in the prices of 
investment goods in the long run.  The response of the system to the supply shock displays a 
modest, but clear echo effect at the baseline capital adjustment horizon of 10 years.  The echo 
reflects a fraction of firms who had delayed their investment when the shock hit the system.  These 
firms remain on a delayed adjustment schedule, reducing investment demand and causing a drop 
in investment prices, while investment retiming costs prevent other firms from adjusting the 
pattern of their investment decisions to take advantage of temporarily low prices.  In contrast, 
without investment retiming costs, the near infinite elasticity of intertemporal substitution causes 
firms to arbitrage away predictable movements in prices and thus eliminates the echo effects. 
 If we interpret temporary investment supply shocks as disturbances to the financial sector, 
these results indicate that retiming costs play an important role in limiting the ability of these 
disturbances to drive business cycle fluctuations.  In the model, even moderate retiming costs of 
0.05 percent reduce the short-run fall in aggregate investment by almost half.  To the extent that 
retiming costs vary by industry, evidence of retiming costs in the data would help policy makers 
identify which sectors of the economy are more resilient to temporary investment supply 
disruptions. 
Investment Tax Subsidy.  We consider a sequence of back-to-back temporary investment tax 
subsidies of 10 percent.  This experiment is a stylized version of the policy variations studied by 
Adda and Cooper (2000).  Adda and Cooper analyze a French auto scrapping subsidy which paid 
individuals to scrap their old cars and purchase new ones.  They focus on the evolution of the 
cross-sectional distribution of car vintages in response to the policy and argue that the resulting 
distributional dynamics would alter the outcome of the tax policy. 
 The top panel of Figure 3.2 shows the two temporary 10 percent subsidies, each lasting for 
one year, timed so that the second subsidy arrives one year after the end of the first one.  We 
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assume each subsidy is unanticipated.  The middle panel shows the response of aggregate 
investment and the lower panel shows the response of investment prices.  In the conventional case 
of no retiming costs, both aggregate investment and capital goods prices rise sharply.  The ten 
percent incentive causes investment to increase by roughly 50 percent while the incentive is in 
effect.  The second subsidy is almost equally effective in stimulating investment as the first round.  
While aggregate investment slightly falls after each subsidy expires, the effect is barely noticeable. 
Investment retiming costs temper the effects of the subsidies.  Notice that the response to 
the second subsidy is markedly less pronounced than the response to the first round in the presence 
of the retiming costs.  Many firms who have just adjusted their capital stocks during the first 
subsidy are not willing to invest again when the second subsidy is offered because two back-to-
back investment episodes would represent a large, costly deviation from their steady-state 
investment timing.  This is exactly the type of effect that Adda and Cooper (2000) anticipated, 
though our result relies directly on the investment retiming friction. 
A striking implication of retiming costs is that investment falls immediately after the 
subsidy expires.  For sufficiently high values of the retiming cost parameter, the increase in 
investment during the subsidy is almost entirely offset by the investment decline following the 
expiration of the subsidy.  The subsidy causes some firms to invest while it is in effect.  These 
firms will then be unwilling to invest again after the subsidy expires because such investment 
would happen too soon relative to the firms’ steady state adjustment horizon. 
The drop in investment immediately after a temporary subsidy is a feature of many partial 
equilibrium investment models.  Indeed, it is also present in our specification without retiming 
costs, although in that case it is extremely attenuated.  Cohen and Cummins (2006) exploited the 
“pothole” effect to examine the effectiveness of the 2002 and 2003 “bonus depreciation” episode.  
Businesses were temporarily allowed to deduct an additional 30 percent, later expanded to 50 
percent, of the cost of qualifying investment in the first year. Cohen and Cummins used a 
differences-in-differences identification strategy, which in addition to the pothole considers cross-
sectional variation in the useful lives of equipment, and found only limited evidence that bonus 
depreciation affected spending.  Their conclusions are consistent with the adjustment cost 
specifications in our model, which produce more attenuated investment dynamics following the 
temporary subsidy. 
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Mian and Sufi (2012) drew similar conclusions in their study of a related form of fiscal 
stimulus, the 2009 Cars Allowance Rebate System (CARS) program, also known as Cash for 
Clunkers.  The program offered temporary incentives for households to trade in their older vehicles 
for new fuel-efficient cars.  Using variation in the distribution of clunkers across cities before the 
policy, Mian and Sufi showed that the program succeeded only in shifting the timing of car 
purchases.  Although households increased purchases contemporaneously with the subsidy, this 
increase was followed by an offsetting decline after the incentive expired. 
Lastly, we note that as in the case of the investment supply shock, high investment 
adjustment costs induce echo effects in investment and capital goods prices at the 10-year steady-
state adjustment horizon. 
An Out-of-Steady State Initial Distribution.  In our third experiment, we consider the equilibrium 
path of investment and prices when the system begins with an out-of-steady-state distribution.17  
The specific example considered is a distribution with an unusually large number of firms with 
capital between 4 and 6 years old.  The distribution is depicted in the top panel of Figure 3.3.  The 
steady state distribution (dark line) is included for comparison.  Because the out-of-steady-state 
distribution has twice as many firms with five-year-old capital, one would anticipate that, in 
roughly 5 years, prices and investment would rise dramatically as these firms approach the 
adjustment trigger.  If firms could not change the timing of investment at all, then aggregate 
investment would rise by 100 percent in roughly 5 years. 
Figure 3.3 presents the equilibrium path of investment given the initial distribution shown 
in the top panel.  The middle panel shows the reaction of aggregate investment.  Without 
investment retiming costs, or with sufficiently low investment retiming costs, the distorted initial 
distribution has little bearing on the equilibrium.  The conventional supply and demand prediction 
that prices and investment should rise as the mass of firms adjusts is present, but is quantitatively 
negligible relative to the magnitude of the distributional change.  While there are twice as many 
firms with five-year-old capital, instead of an increase of 100 percent, investment rises by less of 
one percent. 
                                                          
17 This experiment is inspired by Gourio and Kashyap (2007).  House (2014) also considers the Gourio and Kashyap 
experiment in his analysis of long-lived investment. 
76 
Investment retiming costs amplify fluctuations in aggregate investment and prices resulting 
from the out-of-steady-state distribution.  If investment retiming costs are roughly 5 percent then 
aggregate investment rises by more than 10 percent when the mass of firms with five-year-old 
initial capital reach their adjustment trigger.  The magnitude of the effect increases sharply with 
retiming costs.  If retiming costs equal 10 percent, aggregate investment rises by more than 15 
percent.  As in the other two numerical experiments, there is a noticeable echo effect at the 10-
year adjustment horizon. 
Summary.  Several clear patterns emerge from the numerical experiments presented above.  First, 
in the presence of investment retiming costs, investment is less sensitive to shocks to the supply 
of capital goods.  Second, the effectiveness of temporary investment subsidies is reduced.  Lastly, 
with retiming costs, there can be predictable variations in after-tax investment prices.  Without 
retiming costs, anticipated changes in after-tax prices would cause a large number of firms to alter 
the timing of their investment decisions, arbitraging away such price changes.  The retiming costs 
limit the extent to which this arbitrage occurs.  Third, with retiming costs, variations in the 
distribution of capital holdings across firms have quantitatively significant influences on economic 
activity.  Finally, both investment and prices display noticeable echo effects. 
If there are costs of adjusting the timing of investment then we would expect to observe 
the same patterns described above in the actual investment data. In particular, we would expect 
that changes in capital goods prices would be somewhat predictable and we would expect to find 
a relatively large autocovariance occurring at the typical investment horizon. Estimates of actual 
autocovariance functions for real investment spending do in fact suggest that autocovariances are 
particularly high for some investment types at horizons of roughly 5 years. In addition, actual real 
relative prices for investment goods are moderately forecastable at horizons of 1-2 years 
suggesting that the elasticity of investment demand is not as high as neoclassical investment 
models would indicate. While such statistics would be expected in the presence of investment 
timing adjustment costs, they are not direct evidence of the timing adjustment costs themselves 
and so we do not pursue these empirical tests further in this study. Appendix 3.A presents a short 
discussion of these empirical patterns as they relate to investment timing adjustment costs.  
Empirical evidence.  Empirical evidence for the retiming costs considered in this study can in 
theory be obtained by estimating the structural parameters of the model, including the adjustment 
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cost parameter b.  In the presence of retiming costs, we would expect to find the same patterns 
described above in the actual investment data.  For plausible values of the retiming costs, however, 
the magnitude of the effects would be subtle, which poses challenges for identification.  Indeed, 
we find only limited evidence that firms face costs when they retime their investment decisions.  
We describe our estimation approach, results, and identification challenges in Appendix 3.A. 
 In Figure 3.4, we present visual evidence that retiming costs generate realistic investment 
autocovariances. that would otherwise not emerge in the fixed costs model.  We compare the 
autocovariance function for fabricated metal18 with autocovariances from the model with different 
retiming cost parameters.  The simulations use an adjustment horizon T = 5 years and the 
depreciation rate of fabricated metals   = 0.09 annually.  The other parameters are the baseline 
parameters in Table 3.1.  The figure shows that without retiming costs, the model produces a 
smoothly declining autocovariance series.  As retiming costs increase, the series becomes hum-
shaped and is close to the curve obtained from the actual data for b = 0.01 and b = 0.05.  Although 
for other types of capital goods the simulated patterns are not as close to the data as for fabricated 
metals, this suggests that a different identification strategy may be able to take advantage of these 
patterns and estimate adjustment costs in the data.  We leave this exercise for future research.  
3.4. CONCLUSION 
We analyze a model of lumpy investment in which firms face both standard adjustment costs and 
investment retiming frictions that temper firms’ intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  We use 
the model to simulate the response of investment and capital goods prices to an investment supply 
shock, a temporary investment subsidy, and we explore the effects of an out-of-steady state 
distribution of firms over capital vintages for aggregate investment.  We find that in the presence 
of retiming costs, the implications of the model are substantially different than those of 
conventional fixed-costs investment model.   
With retiming costs, micro-level heterogeneity in the distribution of capital holdings across 
firms affects the dynamics of aggregate investment quantities and prices.  Retiming costs induce 
predictable movements in the prices of capital goods, as firms are less willing to deviate from their 
steady-state investment patterns, thus do not arbitrage away such movements. Importantly, if 
                                                          
18 The shape of the autocovariance function is not an artifact of the HP filter used to detrend the data.  In Figure 3.5, 
we show that the shape of the autocovariance series is preserved for reasonable smoothing parameters. 
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retiming costs are high, investment is less responsive to temporary investment supply shocks that 
drive business cycle fluctuations. 
The model offers sharp predictions for the effectiveness of temporary investment stimulus. 
Without retiming costs, temporary subsidies strongly increase investment contemporaneously, 
while the decline in investment after the subsidies expire is negligible.  In contrast, if firms do face 
retiming costs, they are less willing to increase investment while subsidies are in effect.  
Furthermore, the temporary increase in investment is followed by a substantial, potentially 
offsetting decline once the subsidy is no longer offered.  In this case, the dynamic effects limit the 
overall effectiveness of the subsidy, which succeeds only in shifting the timing of investment.
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TABLE 3.1. RETIMING COSTS MODEL: BASELINE PARAMETERS 
 
Parameter Baseline Value 
Discount rate, annual ( r ) 0.02 
Depreciation rate, annual ( ) 0.10 
Curvature of profit function ( ) 0.90 
Steady state adjustment horizon (T ) (years) 10.00 
Elasticity of aggregate investment supply (  ) 5.00 
First autoregressive root of supply shock (
1
 ) 1.60 
First autoregressive root of supply shock (
2
 ) -0.65 
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FIGURE 3.1. EQUILIBRIUM RESPONSE TO AN INVESTMENT SUPPLY SHOCK
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FIGURE 3.2. EQUILIBRIUM RESPONSE TO A SEQUENCE OF TEMPORARY ITC SHOCKS 
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FIGURE 3.3. AN OUT-OF-STEADY-STATE DISTRIBUTION
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FIGURE 3.4. FABRICATED METALS: DATA AND MODEL AUTOCOVARIANCE FUNCTION 
 
Notes.  The black line gives the point estimate of the autocovariance of real investment spending in fabricated metals.  The log of real investment 
spending was detrended with an HP-filter with a smoothing parameter ( ) of 1600.  We simulated investment paths from the quantitative model 
calibrated using a steady-state adjustment horizon of T = 5 years, and the annual depreciation rate for fabricated metals δ = 0.09 annually.  All other 
parameters are set as in the baseline parameterization in Table 3.1. 
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FIGURE 3.5. FABRICATED METALS: AUTOCOVARIANCE FUNCTIONS, 
 ALTERNATE HP SMOOTHING PARAMETERS 
 
Notes.  Each line corresponds to an estimate of the autocovariance function for investment in fabricated metals.  In each case, the log of real 
investment is detrended by a different HP smoothing parameter (listed above).  This figure shows that the peak in the autocovariance at approximately 
5 years is not an artifact of the smoothing parameter used by the HP filter.
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APPENDIX 3.A 
RETIMING COSTS MODEL SOLUTION AND STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION 
In this appendix, we discuss the direct inference structural estimation of the model parameters.  
The empirical strategy is to match moments generated by the model with their reduced-form 
analogues estimated using data on investment, capital goods prices and investment subsidies.  We 
start by presenting the data and methodology, then we present our results and expand on the 
reasons the identification of the structural parameters faces considerable challenges. 
Research Design.  Our empirical research design uses data on aggregate investment quantities and 
prices.  The data is disaggregated according to BEA underlying detail tables for investment.  
Unlike many other papers in the literature, we do not use “micro-data” to study the effects of lumpy 
investment. 
Micro-data sets like the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) have some advantages that 
we forego in our analysis.  Among other things, micro-data offer detailed information on plant 
level investment.19  The lack of direct observations on firm-level investment and on the distribution 
of firms across capital holdings is a serious drawback of our empirical approach.  Firm-level 
adjustment patterns and the distribution of capital holdings feature prominently in the theory and 
in much of the existing empirical research on lumpy investment.  That said, there are reasons that 
such observations may not be essential to understand aggregate investment.  Indeed, in 
conventional models with no retiming costs, the distribution of firms over capital holdings has 
virtually no implications for the timing of investment at all. 
At the same time, our aggregate data has advantages relative to micro-data.  First, the 
investment figures in micro-data sets are a combination of many different types of capital goods, 
some which are subject to fixed adjustment costs and some which are not.  Furthermore, the micro-
                                                          
19 See for example, Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993), Doms and Dunne (1998). 
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data sets contain virtually no information on investment prices.  The main advantage of our 
approach is the explicit treatment of prices.  Current and expected future prices of capital goods 
are critical factors for firms’ investment decisions.  The dynamics of aggregate prices offer insight 
into the investment adjustment process at the firm level.  Our numerical experiments illustrate the 
specific patterns that may provide evidence of investment retiming costs.  In the presence of such 
costs, aggregate investment prices should display predictable changes over time.  In contrast, 
without retiming costs, prices should roughly follow a random walk. 
Data.  We use data on nominal investment spending and investment prices from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis’ (BEA) underlying detail tables and data on the production of capital goods 
from the NBER Productivity Database.  These data form a panel of investment quantities and 
prices by type.  We exclude computers and software because these categories exhibit extreme 
movements in prices and are notoriously difficult to measure.  Depreciation rates for each type 
come from Fraumeni (1997).  Our panel has 42 types of investment goods with quarterly 
observations from 1965:1 to 2005:4.  Let 1,..., 42m =  denote an arbitrary type of investment.  Real 
investment purchases of type m investment are calculated by dividing nominal investment 
purchases for type m by the price index for that type.  The pre-tax relative price for type m capital 
is defined as the mth price index divided by the price index for nondurable consumption from the 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). 
Investment Supply.  We specify an isoelastic investment supply curve for aggregate investment.  
The baseline supply elasticity is a supply elasticity of 0.74 for equipment and 1.16 for structures.  
Because the supply elasticity has important effects on the behavior of the system, we also conduct 
a sensitivity analysis in which we consider higher elasticities. 
Investment Demand Estimation.  We investigate the extent to which the key determinants of 
investment demand at the firm-level can explain the observed features of aggregate investment 
and investment goods prices.  We model investment demand as described in Section 3.2.  In the 
model, the response of firms to investment goods prices and current macroeconomic conditions is 
governed by several parameters:  the cost of retiming investment b, the adjustment horizon T , 
returns to scale at the firm-level   and the variance of productivity shocks 2Z .  For each type of 
investment m, we estimate 2,, , ,m m m mZb T       by the method of simulated moments (MSM). 
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Extensive-Only Case.  The quantitative model assumes each firm is free to choose its optimal reset 
capital stock.  The firm faces two decisions: on the extensive margin, the firm decides whether to 
adjust its capital stock in the current period; on the intensive margin, the firm chooses the optimal 
level of the reset capital stock.  We refer to this setting as the intensive case.  For the purpose of 
structural estimation, we consider a simplified version of the model in which the firm is constrained 
to adjust to a fixed (time-invariant) reset capital stock every period.  We refer to this variant of the 
model as the extensive-only case.  This assumption allows us to isolate the implications of retiming 
costs when firms experience various shocks. 
Moments: The features of the data we would like to match include the variances and the covariance 
of investment quantities and prices; the response of investment goods prices to investment 
subsidies; the forecastability of investment goods prices; and the cyclical properties of investment.  
Therefore the moments we match are the OLS estimates for a series of equations specified to 
capture these empirical features. 
 The moments include the variances and covariance of investment and prices for each type 
m, denoted ˆm
I
v , ˆm
p
v  and 
,
ˆm
I p
c .  We use the natural log of the aggregate investment and price series, 
detrended with the HP filter with smoothing parameter 1,600.  These moments help identify the 
variance of investment demand shock, and their magnitude relative to investment supply shocks. 
 The effect of investment subsidies on the prices of investment goods is estimated using a 
specification inspired by Goolsbee (1998): 
 2 1,0 1 2 3ln
m m m m m m m m
t t t tp t t Q            , (1) 
where tQ  is a vector of macroeconomic covariates – detrended log GDP, the log of oil prices, a 
dummy variable for the Nixon price controls, and a measure of stock market volatility.  In our 
MSM procedure, we match the coefficient for the comprehensive tax subsidy 3
m . 
 In the model, firms that face substantial costs to retiming their investment decisions are not 
able to take advantage of forecastable changes in after-tax prices.  Consequently, the after-tax 
prices of capital goods may display forecastable movements in equilibrium.  In contrast, if the 
costs to deviating from the steady state adjustment pattern are negligible, the after-tax prices of 
investment goods will be close to a random walk.  The forecastability of after-tax prices has, 
therefore, important implications for the parameters of our model.  We capture the extent to which 
prices are forecastable by matching a simple reduced-form auto-regression of the subsidized price: 
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  
4
2,
0
1
ln (1 ) ln (1 )     

               m m m m m m mt t j t j t j t
j
p p . (2) 
The coefficients mj  serve as additional moments for our MSM procedure.  The coefficient 
estimates from real after-tax price regression for Fabricated Metals are presented in Table 3.A.1.  
 The cyclical properties of investment provide information about both the steady-state 
adjustment horizon T  from the model, and the magnitude of retiming costs.  The model predicts 
that in the presence of substantial retiming costs, the investment series will display echo effects at 
the adjustment horizon.  In the data, these echoes roughly correspond to long-run humps in the 
autocovariogram of investment.  We estimate autocorrelations up to 40L   quarters for each 
investment type m using equations of form 
 , , 2,0 1  

   
m m l m L m l m
t t l tI I , (3) 
for 1, ,l L  , where mtI is the natural log of investment for type m, detrended with the HP filter 
with smoothing parameter 1,600. The complete set of moments for each type of investment 
goods m is ,1 ,, 3 1 2 3 4 1 1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , , , , , , , '
m m m m m m m m m m m L
I p I pM v v c            .  We estimate a total of L+5 
regressions for each type.  The residuals from these regressions, 1, 2, 5,, , ,m m L m    , are used to 
construct an approximate covariance matrix for the moments, whose inverse becomes the 
weighting matrix for MSM estimation. 
Weighting Matrix:  We exploit the covariance of the moments to improve the efficiency of our 
MSM estimator.  The covariance matrix of the moments is  
 
  1 1ˆ ˆ( ' ) ' ( ' )m m m m m m m m
M
V Q Q Q V Q Q Q , (4) 
where ˆ
mV  is an estimate of the contemporaneous covariance of the errors from all of the 
regressions, and mQ is a block-diagonal matrix, with each block made up of the covariates from 
one of the L+5 regressions.  The covariance of the errors ˆ
mV  is constructed using two simplifying 
assumptions.  First, the errors for each regression are homoskedastic without serial correlation.  
Second, we estimate only the contemporaneous cross-correlations between errors from different 
regressions.  The weighting matrix for the MSM procedure for investment type m is then 
  1ˆm mMW V

 . 
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Simulation: The equations governing the model are linearized around the non-stochastic steady 
state.  Using the Anderson-Moore (AIM) algorithm, we compute a rational expectations 
equilibrium.  The linear solution of the model implies a VAR process 
    1m mt t tY F Y G    . (5) 
Here m  is a vector of known and unknown parameters and Y is a vector of all variables in the 
system including the shocks, and the distribution of capital holdings across firms.  The parameter 
vector m  includes investment supply parameters , ,,1 ,2[ , , , , ]     m m m m perm m transS x x x x  estimated as 
described above, as well as investment demand parameters [ , , , ]m m m m mD Zb T   . The transition 
matrix F and the matrix G that relates structural and reduced-form innovations are functions of the 
parameter vector m . 
Given a set of parameters, we draw 500N   sets of normally distributed permanent 
supply, transitory supply and permanent demand shocks20, and we generate simulated investment 
and investment price series of the same length as the observed data series from the BEA.  Firms 
are allowed to adjust only at the extensive margin.  Although this assumption is restrictive, it helps 
identify the planning horizon T and the adjustment retiming cost parameter b , eliminating 
variation in the simulated series due to changes in the reset capital stock.  The depreciation rate for 
each type is as taken from Fraumeni (1997).  The real rate of return r  is set to 2 percent annually, 
consistent with U.S. post-war real interest rates.  The investment subsidy variables correspond to 
the observed ITC and tax depreciation schedules (including the so-called bonus depreciation policy 
in 2002–2005).  For purposes of forming expectations, we assume that firms view all changes in 
investment tax subsidies as permanent.21  Therefore, expectations of the ITC are governed by: 
 1
   t t t . (6) 
This strong assumption may have a material effect on our estimates.  However, it is a reasonable 
characterization of U.S. tax policy, considering that temporary subsidies often become long-
lasting.  Furthermore, estimates of the persistence of the investment subsidy are unable to reject a 
unit root. 
                                                          
20 The “permanent” shocks in the system are actually trend stationary.  The AR roots are set to 101 1 10  , as our 
solution method requires that the system is strictly stationary. 
21 As above, for strict stationarity, the ITC has an AR coefficient of 101 1 10  . 
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 For each simulated series 1, ,n N  , we estimate the moments , ( )m n mDM   by OLS as 
described above, treating the simulated data symmetrically to the observed data series.22  The 
MSM estimator is 
 ˆ argmin ( ) ' ( )
m
D
m m m m m m m m
D D D
M M W M M

              . (7) 
Here ( )m m
D
M   is the average of the moments over the N simulations, i.e. 
  ,1( ) 1 ( )Nm m m n mD DnM N M   .  We minimize the MSM objective function numerically.  We 
compute analytical standard errors based on the asymptotic distribution of the MSM estimator as 
a special case of a direct inference estimator in Gourieroux, Montfort and Renault (1993). 
Structural Estimates.  In this section, we present our structural estimates for the extensive-only 
specification.  Table 3.A.2 shows results for equipment, and Table 3.A.3 shows results for 
structures. 
Retiming Costs.  Of particular interest to our study is the degree to which firms can adjust the 
timing of large investment episodes.  This is captured by the parameter b , which represents the 
minimum benefit, expressed as a fraction of firm value that the firm requires to alter the timing of 
its investment relative to the steady-state pattern, given investment retiming costs.  For many types, 
this parameter estimate is less than one percent of the steady-state value of the firm.  However, 
there are several types of equipment investment goods in Table 3.A.2 that appear to have 
substantial costs associated with varying the timing of adjustment.  Medical equipment and 
instruments, nonmedical instruments, metalworking machinery, general industrial equipment and 
automobile investment all have retiming costs that exceed one percent.  Some of the estimates 
exceed 10 percent of the value of the firm.  In Table 3.A.3, we do not find evidence of high retiming 
costs for any type of structures investment.  Surprisingly, among equipment investment, but not 
among structures investment, there are several types of capital goods that seem to exhibit empirical 
patterns that are close to fixed (s,S) rules at the aggregate level. 
                                                          
22 The macroeconomic covariates 
t
Q  are excluded from equation (1), since these variables play no role in the 
quantitative model.  This will not bias the coefficient estimate in the model though with a finite sample of observations 
it would reduce the precision of the estimate.  This is fortunately not a concern for the simulation since we simulate a 
sufficiently large set of observations so that the coefficient is determined exactly. 
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Adjustment Horizon.  The estimated adjustment horizons T display wide variation, ranging 
between 8 and 20 years for most types.  Furthermore, some of our preliminary estimates are as 
high as 25 years.  The standard errors are extremely large in many cases, indicating that the timing 
horizon is imprecisely estimated.  Even in our numerical exercises, the echo effects that would 
help identify this horizon are modest.  If such dynamics are present in the data, they may be 
obscured by various other shocks affecting the demand and supply of investment goods. 
 Our adjustment horizon estimates are high relative to standard calibrations in the literature.  
Many other researchers calibrate models to imply an average adjustment horizon of roughly 5 to 
6 years.  This calibration is based on patterns of “investment spikes” taken from micro data.  Since 
investment spikes occur in roughly 20 percent of year-plant observations, calibrated models 
typically have 5-year adjustment horizons.  However, the definition of an investment spike is 
arbitrary.  Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993, 2006) define an investment spike as a year plant 
observation in which capital increases by more than 30 percent.  If this cutoff were increased, the 
micro data would indicate a lower frequency of lumpy investment and thus a longer adjustment 
horizon. 
Returns to scale.  The returns to scale parameter   is also of interest.23  The estimates of this 
parameter vary between 0.45 and 0.99, with an average of roughly 0.80.  There are no systematic 
differences between returns to scale for equipment and structures. This range is comparable to the 
estimates in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).  
Interpretation and implications.  Our estimates suggest that there is at least some evidence that for 
certain types of capital goods firms are resistant to making large changes in the timing of 
investment.  We should emphasize that these estimates correspond to aggregate behavior and it is 
not necessary for these estimates to match up with micro estimates.  For a stark example of this, 
suppose most of the firms as the micro level follow fixed (s,S) rules but that there is a modest 
fraction that follow state-dependent (s,S) policies as in Thomas (2002), Gourio and Kashyap 
(2007) and House (2008).  In this case, the micro data would suggest that most firms were unable 
(or unwilling) to change the timing of their investment decisions.  In contrast, the firms that are 
able to change their investment timing effectively arbitrage predictable movements in after-tax 
                                                          
23 The returns to scale parameter may not reflect technical or productive returns to scale but may instead reflect 
market power as described by Cooper and Haltiwanger 2006). 
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prices.  In this example, while the micro estimates would indicate that most firms were reluctant 
to change the timing of investment, the aggregate estimates support modeling aggregate 
investment as though firms could alter investment timing freely.  In this situation, researchers 
could use standard neoclassical investment models to describe equilibrium investment and prices. 
Although we find considerable heterogeneity across the types of investment goods included 
in our analysis, the estimates suggest that in some cases retiming costs are substantial.  For these 
types of investment goods, the cross-sectional distribution of capital holdings matters at the 
aggregate level.  Our model with explicit costs of retiming investment decisions offers an 
advantage over conventional investment models for these types.  For many other types of 
investment goods, however, we do not find compelling evidence that retiming frictions affect the 
aggregate dynamics of investment and capital goods prices. 
Identification.  For many types of investment goods, the key parameters that govern investment 
demand at the firm level are imprecisely estimated.  If investment retiming costs are low, returns 
to scale  , the steady-state timing horizon T and the variance of investment demand shocks 2
Z
 
are not well identified.  Indeed, the numerical experiments in Section 3.3 suggest that absent 
substantial retiming costs, predictable movements in aggregate investment prices—echo effects at 
the adjustment horizon and any effects of the distribution of firms across capital holdings on the 
equilibrium are negligible.  Furthermore, if returns to scale at the firm level   are close to unity, 
firms are more willing to retime their investment decisions.  With constant returns to scale, the 
value of an additional unit of capital is roughly constant, regardless if firms have outdated capital 
stock, or have adjusted their capital stock recently.  We find that for many types of investment 
goods, returns to scale are indeed close to unity.  In this case, we expect that we are not able to 
precisely estimate the other parameters governing firms’ investment decisions. 
 In other words, the identification of the key parameters of investment demand does not 
depend only on the data, but also on the values of the true parameters.  Simulation experiments 
confirm this intuition. We consider three different values of the retiming cost parameter b: 0.0001, 
0.01 and 0.1, and three values for returns to scale  : 0.6, 0.8 and 0.99.  For all combinations of 
the two parameters, we simulate aggregate investment and price series of the same length as the 
panel of BEA data.  We then estimate the parameters governing investment demand ( 2, , , Zb T   ) 
using the same MSM procedure presented in the appendix 3.A that we apply to actual data.  We 
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repeat the experiment for each combination of parameters, and compare both the average estimates 
to the true parameters of the model, as well as the standard deviation of the estimates to the average 
analytical standard errors.  Table 3.A.4. summarizes the results of these experiments.  As expected, 
when the retiming cost parameter is low, the other parameters are imprecisely estimated.  The 
analytical standard errors are much larger than the empirical standard deviations, and both types 
of standard errors are significant. 
 When firms face costs to retiming their investment decisions, they are less willing to delay 
or accelerate investment relative to steady state patterns to take advantage of predictable 
movements in investment goods prices.  Aggregate prices should, therefore, display such 
movements in equilibrium.  In contrast, in the absence of retiming costs, firms arbitrage away any 
predictable variations in prices, and prices should be close to a random walk.  The identification 
of investment retiming costs in our model thus relies crucially on the properties of aggregate price 
series.  We conduct augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for the presence of unit roots in after-
tax real investment prices for each of the 42 types of capital goods in our panel.  Both the estimated 
regression model and the underlying data generating process are assumed to have a drift and a time 
trend.  We consider two specifications: in the first version, we impose four lags for all types; in 
the second, we allow for lag order uncertainty and estimate the lag order using the criterion 
proposed by Ng and Perron (1995).  When we impose the lag order, we fail to reject the null of a 
unit root at the 10% confidence level for all types of investment goods, with the exception of other 
power equipment and railroads, for which we only fail to reject the null at the 5% confidence level. 
When we estimate the lag order, we still fail to reject the presence of a unit root at the 10% level 
for most types.  We fail to reject it at the 5% level for manufacturing equipment and mining 
equipment, and reject it for other power equipment and single-family structures. The ADF statistics 
are presented in Table 3.A.5.  Although ADF tests are biased towards failing to reject the null, 
these results indicate that the prices of investment goods are indeed close to a random walk. 
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TABLE 3.A.1. FORECASTABILITY OF INVESTMENT PRICES: FABRICATED METALS 
 
 
constant  1  2  3  4
0.1882 -0.0024 -0.0644 0.0775 0.1158 
(0.2246) (0.0800) (0.0798) (0.0798) (0.0804)
Real After-Tax Price Regression
   
4
0
1
ln (1 ) ln (1 )t t j t j t j t
j
p p     

         
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TABLE 3.A.2. INVESTMENT DEMAND ESTIMATES: EQUIPMENT 
 
 
b   Z 2 T b   Z 2 T
0.21 0.77 0.01 11.23 0.00 0.45 0.01 17.53 
(0.03) (0.09) (1.10) (1.31) (0.00) (0.14) (0.33) (14.46)
0.04 0.99 0.01 12.99 0.00 0.99 0.01 9.08 
(0.37) (0.03) (1.96) (43.01) (0.00) (0.97) (1.92) (144.85)
0.10 0.98 0.01 17.24 0.00 0.99 4.70 10.64 
(0.10) (0.22) (3.00) (32.18) (0.00) (8.63) (2.00) (588.82)
0.04 0.99 0.01 23.30 0.00 0.96 0.16 6.87 
(0.11) (0.01) (0.36) (58.50) (0.01) (0.55) (2.65) (11.45)
0.00 0.99 0.00 7.97 0.00 0.95 0.03 6.35 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.92) (2.70) (0.00) (0.22) (1.49) (3.62)
0.00 0.77 0.01 5.22 0.00 0.47 4.25 25.00 
(0.00) (4.34) (2.27) (5.60) (0.00) (0.04) (1.19) (10.00)
0.00 0.98 14.23 8.99 0.06 0.45 4.15 18.01 
(0.00) (10.28) (11.39) (394.59) (0.02) (0.04) (1.77) (1.78)
0.16 0.93 3.55 13.24 0.00 0.99 0.06 25.00 
(0.22) (0.77) (1.70) (3.24) (0.00) (0.05) (0.04) (263.60)
0.05 0.98 0.01 15.91 0.16 0.95 0.01 11.92 
(0.02) (0.25) (1.18) (10.14) (0.21) (0.35) (2.53) (4.13)
0.07 0.52 3.64 16.67 0.00 0.73 0.00 24.99 
(0.01) (0.05) (3.70) (0.84) (0.00) (0.06) (0.29) (9.76)
0.07 0.99 0.01 18.17 0.05 0.45 0.01 20.33 
(0.07) (0.01) (2.89) (28.10) (0.01) (0.11) (0.60) (4.66)
0.00 0.45 8.55 6.06 0.00 0.89 0.00 6.34 
(0.00) (1.80) (4.77) (0.25) (0.00) (1.39) (0.31) (20.02)
0.00 0.87 3.44 6.92 0.00 0.65 0.01 5.82 
(0.00) (2.69) (1.11) (54.00) (0.00) (0.13) (7.62) (22.55)
0.13 0.91 8.28 14.47 
(0.02) (0.34) (2.97) (1.46)
Communication equipment
Medical equipment and instruments
General industrial
Electrical transmission, dist
Trucks, buses, and truck trailers
Autos
Nonmedical instruments
Photocopy and related equipment
Office and accounting equipment
Fabricated metal products
Steam engines
Internal combustion engines
Other electrical equipment
Other construction machinery
Mining and oilfield machinery
Service industry machinery
Household furniture
Other furniture
Household appliances
Aircraft
Ships and boats
Railroad equipment
Farm tractors
Other agricultural machinery
Construction tractors
Metalworking machinery
Special industry machinery, n.e.c.
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TABLE 3.A.3. INVESTMENT DEMAND ESTIMATES: STRUCTURES 
b   Z 2 T
0.00 0.45 0.01 24.65 
(0.00) (0.13) (2.03) (12.45)
0.00 0.45 0.01 10.72 
(0.00) (1.96) (3.64) (11.65)
0.00 0.99 0.01 12.40 
(0.00) (3.56) (2.42) (94.53)
0.00 0.45 0.01 13.88 
(0.00) (3.80) (2.65) (60.66)
0.00 0.98 0.01 11.29 
(0.00) (2.94) (15.71) (205.40)
0.00 0.99 0.01 19.68 
(0.00) (0.87) (1.98) (527.56)
0.00 0.45 42.54 18.64 
(0.00) (0.46) (12.63) (7.50)
0.00 0.45 0.01 24.06 
(0.00) (0.12) (1.25) (1.42)
0.00 0.99 0.01 18.56 
(0.00) (0.71) (1.83) (147.18)
0.00 0.94 0.00 25.00 
(0.00) (0.33) (1.48) (57.97)
0.00 0.98 0.03 8.32 
(0.00) (4.07) (4.33) (70.67)
0.00 0.99 0.01 18.25 
(0.01) (4.06) (1.79) (1748.92)
0.00 0.99 0.03 8.65 
(0.00) (5.78) (3.41) (517.35)
0.00 0.75 0.02 21.77 
(0.00) (0.88) (0.60) (65.00)
0.00 0.99 0.01 16.05 
(0.01) (0.79) (3.67) (661.87)
Other residential structures
Petroleum and natural gas
Mining
Religious
Educational
Railroads
Other power
Communication
Farm
Single-family structures
Multifamily structures
Commercial, including office
Hospitals and special care
Manufacturing
Electric
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TABLE 3.A.4. IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTMENT DEMAND PARAMETERS 
 
Notes.  For each combination of parameters, the table presents average estimates, empirical standard errors, 
and the average analytical standard errors. In all simulations, the variance of demand shocks is 2Z = 1 and 
the steady-state adjustment horizon is T = 10 years. 
b   Z 2 T b 
Estimates 0.000 0.742 0.048 12.589 0.0001
Standard deviation (0.002) (0.190) (0.095) (7.779)
Analytical standard errors (0.004) (1.512) (1.078) (114.433)
Estimates 0.000 0.799 0.104 15.812 0.0001
Standard deviation (0.000) (0.161) (0.366) (8.631)
Analytical standard errors (0.002) (1.723) (0.711) (121.872)
Estimates 0.001 0.875 0.334 16.826 0.0001
Standard deviation (0.004) (0.130) (0.662) (8.249)
Analytical standard errors (0.008) (1.312) (0.894) (297.817)
Estimates 0.091 0.853 1.681 14.533 0.01
Standard deviation (0.048) (0.206) (2.958) (2.773)
Analytical standard errors (0.127) (0.452) (9.561) (13.060)
Estimates 0.058 0.758 0.253 15.750 0.0001
Standard deviation (0.033) (0.255) (1.110) (4.131)
Analytical standard errors (0.121) (0.389) (4.864) (13.179)
Estimates 0.071 0.695 0.704 15.789 0.0001
Standard deviation (0.049) (0.251) (1.694) (4.000)
Analytical standard errors (0.100) (0.354) (6.610) (10.534)
Estimates 0.152 0.763 13.303 9.629 0.1
Standard deviation (0.098) (0.183) (16.958) (1.878)
Analytical standard errors (0.052) (0.188) (80.460) (1.886)
Estimates 0.131 0.766 9.969 10.696 0.0001
Standard deviation (0.073) (0.199) (18.230) (1.825)
Analytical standard errors (0.070) (0.308) (49.480) (3.524)
Estimates 0.120 0.722 18.195 9.337 0.0001
Standard deviation (0.094) (0.223) (28.210) (1.896)
Analytical standard errors (0.084) (0.168) (79.163) (2.581)
0.8
0.99
0.6
0.8
0.99
0.6
Estimates True parameter 
values
0.6
0.8
0.99
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TABLE 3.A.5. UNIT ROOT TESTS: AFTER-TAX REAL CAPITAL GOODS PRICES 
 
Notes.  The estimated process and the true data generating process are assumed to include a drift and a trend. The critical values are -3.142 at the 
5% confidence level and -3.442 at the 10% confidence level. These values are calculated by interpolation for the sample size based on the table in 
Ha4milton (1994).
A. Lag Order L  = 4 A. Lag Order L  = 4
ADF Statistic Lag Order ADF Statistic ADF Statistic Lag Order ADF Statistic
Communication equipment -0.581 7 -0.834 Mining and oilfield machinery -2.096 6 -1.759
Medical equipment and instruments -1.373 6 -1.213 Service industry machinery -1.842 6 -1.730
Nonmedical instruments -1.666 6 -1.548 Commercial, including office -2.970 1 -2.679
Photocopy and related equipment -1.251 6 -1.144 Hospitals and special care -2.989 1 -2.729
Office and accounting equipment -1.702 6 -1.622 Manufacturing -2.920 5 -3.306
Fabricated metal products -2.258 6 -2.166 Electric -2.275 5 -3.018
Steam engines -1.073 6 -1.099 Other power -3.407 5 -3.924
Internal combustion engines -1.728 6 -1.563 Communication -2.753 1 -2.143
Metalworking machinery -1.657 6 -1.328 Petroleum and natural gas -1.084 6 -0.667
Special industry machinery, n.e.c. -1.360 6 -1.223 Mining -2.495 5 -3.146
General industrial -1.955 6 -1.904 Religious -2.987 1 -2.730
Electrical transmission, dist. -1.461 6 -1.525 Educational -2.995 1 -2.728
Trucks, buses, and truck trailers -1.173 4 -1.173 Railroads -3.147 1 -3.091
Autos -2.047 7 -2.486 Farm -3.013 1 -2.596
Aircraft -2.142 6 -2.052 Single-family structures -3.080 5 -3.471
Ships and boats -2.092 1 -2.354 Multifamily structures -2.607 1 -2.694
Railroad equipment -2.526 6 -2.188 Other residential structures -2.882 1 -2.517
Farm tractors -1.121 6 -0.974 Household furniture -1.771 6 -1.698
Other agricultural machinery -1.915 6 -1.650 Other furniture -2.005 6 -1.977
Construction tractors -1.137 5 -1.596 Household appliances -2.680 6 -2.494
Other construction machinery -2.312 6 -2.150 Other electrical equipment -2.138 1 -1.880
B. Estimated Lag Order B. Estimated Lag Order
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CHAPTER IV 
INVESTMENT SUPPLY SHOCKS 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Shocks to physical investment in equipment and structures drive both long-run economic growth 
and business-cycle fluctuations.  The investment literature distinguishes between two broad types 
of shocks: investment-specific technology change, which govern the production of investment 
goods, and shocks to the transformation of investment goods into productive capital.  The central 
role of investment-specific technology for long-run growth is undisputed, while existing evidence 
about the ability of either type of shock to replicate stylized facts about comovements in output, 
consumption, investment and hours at business cycle frequencies is mixed, and is sensitive to 
modeling choices and identification strategy.  In this chapter, we approach the identification of 
investment shocks from a new perspective and provide a disaggregated view that reflects the 
considerable heterogeneity present in the data across different types of investment goods. 
 Our study of investment supply and investment shocks uses simple reduced-form and 
structural time series methods, in contrast to the SVAR and large-scale DSGE methods used by 
other researchers.  We start by specifying an isoelastic investment supply curve for each type of 
capital.  We calibrate the elasticity of investment supply using empirical evidence on the 
magnitude of the elasticity for equipment and structures.  We assume investment supply shocks 
consist of a permanent and a transitory component. We estimate drift in the permanent shock and 
the persistence of the transitory shock from the equivalent reduced-form time series model.  
Finally, we use the Kalman filter to estimate the variances of the two components and recover the 
shock processes. 
 Our approach requires only mild structural assumptions to characterize the supply of new 
capital goods.  The estimates provide useful insights about the properties and magnitude of 
investment shocks.  The shock processes we recover from the data can be used in conjunction with 
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other evidence to understand the short-run and long-run effects of investment disturbances on 
economic fluctuations and growth.  Additionally, the shocks can be embedded into equilibrium 
models as a realistic source of business-cycle fluctuations. 
 In Section 4.2, we survey the literature on investment shocks.  Section 4.3 presents our 
empirical strategy and the main results.  Section 4.4 concludes. 
4.2. RELATED LITERATURE 
The second half of the twentieth century featured extraordinary technological advances in 
investment goods.  In the economics literature, there is a long tradition of attributing a substantial 
share of economic growth to investment-specific technological change, starting with Solow 
(1960), and followed by the seminal contributions of Hulten (1992) and Greenwood, Hercowitz 
and Krusell (1997).  Using a vintage capital DSGE model, Greenwood et al. found that 
approximately 60 percent of labor productivity growth is due to advances in investment-specific 
technology, while the remaining 40 percent is attributed to neutral technological progress.  Their 
identification strategy relies on the assumption that observed changes the equilibrium price of 
investment goods are a direct reflection of technological improvements in the production of 
investment goods.24 
 Fisher (2006) uses the distinction between neutral and investment-specific technology 
shocks to impose long-run restrictions on a structural VAR model of labor productivity.  He finds 
that in addition to driving economic growth, investment-specific technological change is also a 
determinant of short-run fluctuations in output and hours.  Other researchers reach the same 
conclusion in large-scale DSGE models, notably Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007) 
and Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010).  The Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez 
(2007) study uses data on real relative investment prices in a model inspired by Greenwood et al. 
(1997) and Fisher (2006) with stochastic volatility.  The authors find that variations in the volatility 
of investment-specific technology shocks have a large effect on the volatility of output growth in 
the post-war period.  Justiniano et al. (2010) show that investment shocks are the main 
                                                          
24 The assumption that the real relative price of investment reflects productivity innovations in investment is common 
to most papers discussed in this section, however models where this relationship breaks have been formulated. See, 
for example, Floetotto, Jaimovich and Pruitt (2009) who analyze noncompetitive markets and nominal rigidities, or 
Guerrieri, Henderson and Kim (2014), who consider two sectors with different factor intensities. 
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determinants of business cycle fluctuations in an estimated New-Keynesian DSGE model.  
However, they do not impose restrictions arising from the behavior of investment prices, and 
conclude that this shock is only loosely correlated with the relative price of investment goods, as 
well as considerably more volatile. 
 In contrast, a host of newer studies that distinguish between investment-specific technology 
shocks and shocks to the transformation of investment goods into productive capital contradict the 
earlier evidence, finding that technological advances in the production of investment goods play 
no role in short-run fluctuations.  Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) investigate the role of 
anticipated productivity shocks in creating business cycles in an RBC model featuring real 
rigidities and structural shocks with anticipated and unanticipated components.  They consider two 
investment shocks: the permanent shock, identified from the relative price of investment, has a 
negligible contribution to output fluctuations, while the transitory shock explains 28% of output 
and 63% of investment variation.  Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2011) likewise conclude 
that shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) are the main drivers of business cycle 
fluctuations.  In their specification, investment-specific technology shocks affect only long-run 
growth.  Liu, Waggoner and Zha (2009) find that “depreciation shocks,” similar to the MEI shocks 
considered by Justiniano et al. (2011), also play an important role in generating business cycle 
comovement.  
 This new class of temporary disturbances to the process by which investment goods 
become productive capital supports a wide range of interpretations.  One possibility is that these 
shocks reflect the efficiency of the financial sector, as in the financial accelerator model of 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) or variations in borrowing costs for firms who purchase investment 
goods. Another possible interpretation is that they reflect sudden economic obsolescence for 
certain capital goods producing sectors.  An attractive feature of these shocks is that they succeed 
in reproducing the comovements between output, consumption, investment and hours observed in 
the post-war US economy.  In particular, these shocks generate a counter-cyclicality in the real 
relative price of investment goods. In our study, these investment shocks they correspond to the 
transitory component of investment supply shocks. 
 It is worthwhile noting that empirical evidence about investment-specific technology 
shocks can be gleaned not only from the relative prices of investment goods, but also from other 
observables.  Papanikolaou (2011) measures investment shocks from asset prices, under the 
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assumption that they are reflected in the relative stock returns of investment goods producers.  This 
approach offers high-frequency and forward-looking measures of investment shocks. 
4.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, we use data on investment, capital goods prices and investment tax subsidies to 
evaluate the elasticity of investment supply ξ.  Instead of estimating elasticities directly, we use a 
robust inference procedure proposed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) to obtain evidence 
about the magnitude of the elasticity. We then calibrate the elasticity and estimate the structural 
parameters of the investment supply shock processes for 45 types of capital goods.  Section 4.3.1 
briefly describes the data.  In section 4.3.2, we give an overview of the empirical research design 
and identification strategy.  Section 4.3.3 presents the estimation of the investment supply 
parameters, and section 4.3.4 describes the reduced-form ARIMA estimates for the implied type-
specific supply shocks. 
4.3.1 Data 
We use data on nominal investment spending and investment prices from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis’ (BEA) underlying detail tables and data on the production of capital goods from the 
NBER Productivity Database.  These data form a panel of investment quantities and prices by 
type.  We exclude computers and software because these categories exhibit extreme movements 
in prices and are notoriously difficult to measure.  Our panel includes 45 types of equipment and 
structures with quarterly observations from 1959:1 to 2009:4.  Let 1,..., 42m =  denote an arbitrary 
type of investment.  Real investment purchases of type m investment are calculated by dividing 
nominal investment purchases for type m by the price index for that type.  The pre-tax relative 
price for type m capital is defined as the mth price index divided by the price index for nondurable 
consumption from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). 
We match the investment data to IRS depreciation schedules and investment tax credits.  
We exclude investment types that do not have clear matches to the IRS tax treatment.  The 
investment tax subsidy includes both investment tax credits (ITC) and the present discounted value 
of tax depreciation allowances.  The original data on the ITC and the discounted value of 
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depreciation deductions are available from Jorgenson and Yun (1991).25  Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
present the list of the types used in our analysis with their annual depreciation rates. See the 
discussion in Chapter 2 for a detailed description of how the investment subsidies are calculated.  
Our empirical approach uses data on investment tax subsidies. However, only domestic 
investment spending benefits from subsidies.  For many types of equipment goods, private 
consumption, government spending and international trade introduce a substantial gap between 
investment and domestic production.  To illustrate this fact, we present nominal domestic 
purchases and production of capital goods by type in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.  We have completed the 
analysis using both investment and production data. The results are qualitatively equivalent. For 
the sake of exposition, we present only our results using investment data in this study. For 
structures, Investment is virtually identical to production so this distinction is not necessary. 
Chapter 2 includes additional details about the typical patterns in investment time series.  
Figure 2.1 presents real production, purchases and prices for general industrial equipment.  Figure 
2.2 plots the comprehensive investment subsidy for general equipment.  The subsidy is strictly 
positive reflecting the fact that investment expenditures always receive some form of accelerated 
tax depreciation.  The subsidy also exhibits substantial variation over time.  Most of the variation 
is due to legislative changes in the ITC. 
4.3.2. Model Specification 
The supply of each type of capital good m  is governed by an isoelastic supply curve  
 
1
mm
m m t
t t m
Ip X
I
       
 . (1) 
The parameter mξ   is the supply elasticity, mI  is steady state investment and mtX  is an investment 
supply shock.  Although assuming that the supply of capital goods is isoelastic may appear 
restrictive, this specification is more general than the typical assumption in the investment 
literature which in most cases assumes an infinite elasticity of investment supply—this is 
equivalent to setting m    in equation (1). 
                                                          
25 We are grateful to Jon Samuel for assistance in assembling this data.  We also thank Matthew Shapiro for crucial 
assistance with constructing a modified quarterly subsidy data set. 
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For each type of capital m, the type-specific supply shock is the sum of a permanent shock 
and a transitory shock.  The permanent shock is a random walk with drift.  The transitory shock is 
assumed to be an AR(1) process.  Thus, the supply shock is governed by the following equations 
where mtx  denotes the natural logarithm of the supply shock mtX : 
 , , ,m m perm m transt t tx x x= +    (2) 
 , , ,1 ,m perm m m perm m permt t tx xµ ε−= + +   (3) 
 , , ,1m trans m m trans m transt t tx x     (4) 
The permanent component can be seen as an investment-specific technology shock.  The 
transitory component then is the reduced-form analogues to a shock to the marginal efficiency of 
investment of the type studied in Justiniano et al. (2011) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012). 
Instead of directly estimating the structural unobserved components model implied by equations 
(2)–(4), we fist consider the observationally equivalent reduced-form ARIMA(1,1,1) process for 
each type of investment 
   1 11m m m m m mt t t tx x e e          . (5) 
The derivation of the ARIMA process (5) from the unobserved component model in 
equations (2)–(4) is presented in Appendix 4.A.  We impose the reduced-form parameter estimates 
and estimate the covariance matrix of the two innovations ,m permtε  and 
,m trans
tε  by maximum 
likelihood.  Finally, we recover the two permanent and temporary investment shock series for each 
type using the Kalman filter. 
4.3.3 Calibration of the Investment Supply Elasticity 
We calibrate the investment supply elasticity for equipment and structures rather than estimating 
it directly from the data because of well-known endogeneity issues affecting quantities and prices 
in equilibrium.  Goolsbee (1998), one of the most influential studies of investment supply, 
circumvented these issues by using investment tax incentives as instruments for capital goods 
prices.  More recently, however, several studies challenged Goolsbee’s conclusions. Using an 
updated data set on capital goods prices, as well as a longer sample than Goolsbee, we found in 
Chapter 2 that investment subsidies have a negligible effect on capital goods prices.  Other recent 
papers reached similar conclusions—see, for example Whelan (1999) and House and Shapiro 
105 
(2008).  Without a strong link between investments subsidies and prices, a direct instrumental 
variables estimator would be subjects to the weak instruments problem. 
Empirical Evidence on the Investment Supply Elasticity for Equipment and Structures. The 
structural investment supply curve (1) for type m implies the reduced form regression 
 ln lnm m mt t tI p e      . (6) 
The reduced-form relationship between capital goods prices mtp   and investment subsidies 
m
t  is 
 ln m m mt t tp         . (7) 
Equations (6) and (7) represent a system of simultaneous equations.  Although we do not directly 
estimate the parameters due to the weak instruments problem noted above, we evaluate the 
magnitude of the investment supply elasticity for equipment and structures using an indirect 
method proposed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008).  Chernozhukov and Hansen show that 
their approach to inference is robust to weak identification, as well as to heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation in the data.  For a given candidate value 0  of the investment supply elasticity, 
we regress the transformed dependent variable 0ln ln
m m
t tI p  on the instrument, in this case the 
investment subsidy: 
 0 0 1ln ln .
m m m m
t t t tI p u           (8) 
Under the null hypothesis, the exclusion restriction implies that 1 0  .  Therefore, a test of the 
null that 1 0  in equation (8) is effectively a test of the hypothesis that 0  .   
 This approach is however, not without pitfalls, as it still requires that the instrument is 
exogenous.  In the case of investment subsidies, most legislative changes were motivated by 
exogenous, long-run considerations, but there are also exceptions when investment subsidies were 
intended to provide countercyclical stabilization.  An important and recent example is “bonus 
depreciation.”  Chapter 2 discusses additional details about the nature of investment subsidies. 
We consider a range of plausible values for the investment supply elasticity: 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 
10 and 15.  Pooled OLS results from the Chernozhukov-Hansen procedure with robust standard 
errors are presented in Table 4.3.  For equipment, we fail to reject the medium to high elasticity 
scenarios 5  , 10   and 15  .  This outcome is not surprising – in the data, equipment 
investment is more variable than equipment prices, which suggests that the elasticity of investment 
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supply is high.  For structures, we fail to reject the case when 2   and we strongly fail to reject 
the case when 1.   These results indicate that the supply elasticity for structures is close to unity. 
Our equipment results are consistent with the investment supply estimates in House and 
Shapiro (2008), who exploit theoretical arguments that elasticities for long-lived capital goods can 
be inferred directly from quantities when these assets receive temporary subsidies. Using the same 
dataset as in this study, and variation in investment during from the “bonus depreciation” period 
in 2002 and 2003, House and Shapiro estimate that the elasticity of investment supply is between 
6 and 14 across several reduced-form specifications. These estimates were obtained by pooling 
both equipment and structures. 
For structures, however, the Chernozhukov-Hansen inference method favors a low 
investment supply elasticity close to unity.  Our analysis does not explain why the elasticity for 
structures is substantially lower than that for equipment. It is possible that the supply of structures 
is fundamentally different from the supply of equipment, particularly as equipment can be 
imported and exported, while for structures, production and purchases are virtually identical. 
4.3.4 Estimation of the Stochastic Process for Investment Supply Shocks 
Given the supply elasticity for type m, we can recover the implied time series of investment supply 
shocks directly from the supply equation (6).  More precisely, the natural logarithm of the supply 
shock for a given type is  
 
1ln lnm m mt t tmx p I
    (9) 
We calibrate the elasticity of investment supply to eqp  = 10 for equipment and str = 1.25 for 
structures based on the empirical evidence from section 4.3.3. above. 
For all types of capital goods, the shock series implied by equation (9) is nonstationary.  In 
Table 4.4 we show the results of augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for each capital types.  We used a 
test specification with four lags and a trend.  In almost all cases, we were not able to reject the null 
of a unit root in levels.  We then estimate a reduced-form ARIMA(1,1,1) model for reach type, 
which is observationally equivalent to the unobserved components model in equations (2)–(4).  
The reduced-form estimates for equipment are reported in table 4.5 and the estimates for structures 
are reported in table 4.6. 
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 From the reduced-form estimates, we calculate the structural parameters of the supply 
shock process for reach type, more specifically the drift in the permanent component m  and the 
autoregressive root in the transitory component m .  Equipment types with economically 
significant drift parameters mµ  include communication equipment, electro-medical equipment and 
instruments, photocopy equipment and autos.  Medical instruments and electrical transmission 
equipment also feature considerable drift parameters.  In contrast, the drift estimates for structures 
are smaller than those for equipment, and most of them are not statistically significant.  Among 
structures, they types with considerable drift are hospitals, medical buildings, communication and 
mining structures.  If we interpret the permanent supply shock as investment-specific technological 
progress, these estimates imply a quarterly rate of technological advance on the order of one to 
two percent. In the data, negative drift parameters reflect the systematic decline in the real relative 
price of most types of investment goods over the past fifty years. 
 The autoregressive parameter m  measures the persistence of transitory supply shocks.  
The estimates are generally indicate low to moderate persistence.  No clear patterns in terms of the 
sign or magnitude of the parameters emerge. In the literature on investment shocks, transitory 
supply shocks correspond to the type of disturbances that drive business cycles. 
 Finally, we impose the structural parameters identified using the reduced-form results and 
we estimate the covariance matrix of the permanent and transitory components by maximum 
likelihood using the Kalman filter.  Our variance estimates, presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, 
indicate that for most types of capital goods, both permanent and temporary shocks are substantial.  
The magnitude of the estimates is consistent with the investment shocks literature, particularly 
Justiniani et al. 2011 and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2012 who found evidence that that temporary 
investment shocks are core drivers of business-cycle fluctuations.  On average for equipment, the 
standard deviation of permanent shocks is 0.018 and that of temporary shocks is 0.010 in quarterly 
data.  For structures, the standard deviation of permanent shocks is 0.004 and the standard 
deviation of temporary shocks is 0.002.  Equipment types feature larger supply shocks. For both 
equipment and structures, permanent shocks are about twice as large as temporary shocks. 
 Interestingly, the temporary and permanent components are strongly negatively correlated.  
On average, the correlation of the shocks is -0.93 for equipment and -0.71 for structures.  
Investigating the reason we observe this pattern in the data is outside the scope of this analysis.  If 
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we adopt the interpretation that permanent shocks reflect technology change, and transitory shocks 
reflect disturbances in the marginal efficiency of the process through which the financial system 
converts savings into investment, the development of new technologies may be accompanied by 
inefficiencies in the financial sector, as financial intermediaries face a learning period to 
understand the innovations.  Other studies have similarly found a negative correlation between the 
permanent and transitory components of GDP, notably Gali (1999), who provided evidence that 
hours and productivity are negatively correlated with technology shocks and used a New 
Keynesian model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices to reproduce these facts. 
 Our variance and correlation estimates are similar to those obtained by Morley et al. 
(2003), who studied the difference between the decomposition of GDP into its trend and cycle 
components using Beveridge-Nelson and an unobserved components model with uncorrelated 
shocks.  The Beveridge-Nelson decomposition implies that the permanent trend is the primary 
source of variation, while the uncorrelated unobserved components decomposition indicates the 
opposite that the cycle dominates.  However, once they authors relax the uncorrelated assumption, 
they find a negative correlation of -0.9, and the unobserved components implications are 
reversed—the permanent component assumes the primary role, as in the Beveridge Nelson 
decomposition.  We also find that the permanent component of investment supply shocks is 
relatively more important than the transitory component.   
 The estimates of the permanent and temporary shocks are likely influenced by the 
prominent drop in real relative capital goods prices lasting approximately two years during the 
early 1970s.  After a sharp increase in oil prices, the PCE price series used to construct relative 
investment-goods prices reacted very rapidly while the investment price indices reacted with a 
modest delay.  The Nixon price controls also likely contributed to this episode, which is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 2.  The estimation procedure attributes this large, persistent drop to both 
the permanent and the transitory component.  Researchers often assume that the innovations are 
uncorrelated in unobserved components models, however, in this case, allowing for correlation 
provides more flexibility for the estimation procedure to contend with the rich variation in the 
investment data. 
With the estimated parameters, we use the Kalman filter to recover the smoothed shock 
series for each type.  In Figure 4.1 we present investment, prices, and the two shocks for general 
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industrial equipment, a representative equipment type. In Figure 4.2 we present the same series for 
manufacturing structures. 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we characterize investment supply from a semi-structural perspective.  We present 
empirical evidence that equipment supply is highly elastic, while the elasticity of structures supply 
is close to unity.  We calibrate an isoelastic investment supply curve for each of 45 types of capital 
in our panel data.  We assume that investment supply shocks, mechanically the residuals of the 
supply equation, consist of a permanent and transitory component.  We estimate the parameters of 
the structural time-series model for each type and find that permanent and temporary investment 
supply shock are both considerable.  For most types, temporary shocks generally have moderate 
persistence, and are negatively correlated with the permanent shocks.  These results are consistent 
with the DSGE literature on investment supply shocks, which finds that both permanent and 
transitory investment supply shocks are substantial.  The shock series obtained in this study can 
be embedded in structural general equilibrium models to generate aggregate fluctuations.  We 
leave this exercise to future research. 
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TABLE 4.1. EQUIPMENT TYPES  
  Depreciation (δ) 
Investment Share 
(1990-2009)  
Average Subsidy 
(1990-2009)  
    
Computers and software 0.30 5.76% 41% 
Communication equipment 0.30 6.05% 38% 
Instruments 0.14 3.78% 40% 
Photocopy and related equipment 0.18 0.68% 40% 
Office and accounting equipment 0.15 0.41% 41% 
Fabricated metal products 0.09 0.81% 39% 
Steam engines 0.05 0.30% 35% 
Internal combustion engines 0.21 0.13% 37% 
Metalworking machinery 0.12 1.88% 40% 
Industrial Equipment 0.11 5.55% 39% 
Electrical transmission and distribution 0.05 1.46% 38% 
Trucks, buses, and truck trailers 0.19 5.20% 40% 
Autos 0.17 2.78% 40% 
Aircraft 0.11 1.57% 41% 
Ships and boats 0.06 0.22% 37% 
Railroad equipment 0.06 0.41% 38% 
Household furniture 0.12 0.14% 40% 
Other furniture 0.12 2.22% 40% 
Farm tractors 0.15 0.39% 40% 
Other agricultural machinery 0.12 0.75% 40% 
Construction tractors 0.16 0.15% 41% 
Other construction machinery 0.16 1.33% 41% 
Mining and oilfield machinery 0.15 0.32% 40% 
Service industry machinery 0.17 1.26% 40% 
Household appliances  0.17 0.31% 40% 
        
Notes.  Purchases data is from the BEA, production data from the NBER Productivity Database and 
depreciation rates come from Fraumeni (1997).   
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TABLE 4.2. STRUCTURES TYPES  
 
Depreciation (δ) 
Investment Share 
(1990-2009)  
Average Subsidy 
(1990-2009) 
    
Commercial structures 0.02 6.86% 0.24 
Hospitals, religious, education  0.02 3.15% 0.23 
Manufacturing structures 0.03 2.32% 0.27 
Electric structures 0.02 1.29% 0.32 
Other power 0.02 0.46% 0.32 
Communication 0.02 1.06% 0.33 
Petroleum 0.06 1.99% 0.40 
Railroad structures 0.02 0.35% 0.34 
Farm structures 0.02 0.33% 0.29 
Residential structures 0.01 34.14% 0.27 
        
Notes.  Purchases data is from the BEA, production data from the NBER Productivity Database and 
depreciation rates come from Fraumeni (1997). 
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TABLE 4.3. CHERNOZHUKOV-HANSEN TEST FOR THE INVESTMENT SUPPLY ELASTICITY 
Notes.  The Chernozhukov-Hansen test uses investment subsidies as instruments to test the null hypothesis 
that the investment supply elasticity 
0   .  Under the null hypothesis, we fail to reject the null that the 
estimates from a regression of I p  on the investment subsidy is significantly different from zero.  The 
results indicate that the equipment supply is highly elastic, and that the elasticity of structures supply is 
close to unity. 
 
Equipment  Structures 
Supply 
Elasticity 
2
1  Statistic p value  
Supply 
Elasticity 
2
1  Statistic p value 
0.5 16.87 0.00  0.5 4.40 0.04 
1 12.50 0.00  1 0.39 0.53 
2 7.02 0.01  2 3.94 0.05 
5 1.69 0.19  5 44.93 0.00 
10 0.27 0.61  10 88.91 0.00 
15 0.04 0.84  15 107.8 0.00 
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TABLE 4.4. AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER TEST FOR UNIT ROOT IN INVESTMENT SUPPLY SHOCKS 
Equipment 
ADF 
Statistic p value  Structures 
ADF 
Statistic p value 
Communication equipment 0.38 1.00  Hospitals        -3.80 0.02 
Electro-medical equipment -0.88 0.96  Special care       -2.54 0.31 
Medical instruments -2.08 0.56  Medical buildings       -2.25 0.46 
Nonmedical instruments -2.56 0.30  Multimerchandise shopping       -2.27 0.45 
Photocopy and related equipment -1.37 0.87  Food and beverage   -0.29 0.99 
Office and accounting equipment -1.25 0.90  Warehouses        -1.44 0.85 
Fabricated metal products -2.10 0.54  Other commercial       -0.10 0.99 
Steam engines -2.41 0.37  Manufacturing -3.00 0.13 
Internal combustion engines -1.74 0.73  Electric -2.07 0.56 
Metalworking machinery -1.38 0.87  Other power -4.15 0.01 
Special industry machinery, n.e.c. -1.50 0.83  Communication -1.82 0.69 
General industrial -3.34 0.06  Petroleum and natural gas -0.99 0.95 
Electrical transmission, distribution -3.32 0.06  Mining -1.65 0.77 
Trucks, buses, and truck trailers -2.21 0.49  Religious -1.40 0.86 
Autos -1.66 0.77  Educational -1.31 0.88 
Aircraft -2.59 0.28  Railroads -2.04 0.58 
Ships and boats -1.85 0.68  Farm -1.76 0.72 
Railroad equipment -2.09 0.55  Multifamily structures -2.32 0.42 
Household furniture -1.51 0.83     
Other furniture -3.17 0.09     
Farm tractors -1.35 0.88     
Other agricultural machinery -1.64 0.78     
Construction tractors -2.32 0.42     
Other construction machinery -2.24 0.47     
Mining and oilfield machinery -1.56 0.81     
Service industry machinery -2.61 0.28     
Miscellaneous electrical -2.54 0.31     
Household appliances -2.73 0.23     
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TABLE 4.5. INVESTMENT SUPPLY ESTIMATES: EQUIPMENT 
 
Notes.  These estimates assume the elasticity of equipment supply is eqp  = 10.  On average, the variance 
of the permanent shock is 0.018 and the variance of the temporary shock is 0.010.  The correlation of the 
two shocks is = -0.927. 
  
(1-)     x,perm  x,trans corr
Communication equipment -0.009 -0.016 0.433 -0.018 0.020 0.013 -0.998 
(0.002) (0.110) (0.122) (0.008) (0.003) (0.120)
Electro-medical equipment -0.005 -0.009 0.405 -0.071 0.020 0.012 -0.951 
(0.002) (0.212) (0.217) (0.009) (0.004) (0.193)
Medical instruments -0.003 -0.003 -0.184 0.525 0.014 0.004 -0.964 
(0.001) (0.183) (0.176) (0.007) (0.004) (0.231)
Nonmedical instruments -0.001 -0.001 0.072 0.321 0.016 0.010 -0.946 
(0.002) (0.224) (0.227) (0.007) (0.004) (0.182)
Photocopy and related equipment -0.009 -0.018 0.521 -0.267 0.019 0.007 -0.878 
(0.002) (0.215) (0.245) (0.008) (0.004) (0.216)
Office and accounting equipment -0.006 -0.012 0.469 -0.083 0.015 0.010 -0.856 
(0.002) (0.134) (0.142) (0.006) (0.006) (0.426)
Fabricated metal products 0.001 0.001 0.362 -0.031 0.016 0.004 -0.986 
(0.002) (0.179) (0.193) (0.006) (0.004) (0.235)
Steam engines 0.001 0.000 -1.035 1.035 0.030 0.026 -0.988 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.016) (0.440)
Internal combustion engines 0.001 0.001 0.433 -0.268 0.018 0.015 -0.987 
(0.002) (0.357) (0.369) (0.007) (0.009) (0.480)
Metalworking machinery 0.001 0.001 0.274 0.171 0.015 0.010 -0.951 
(0.002) (0.163) (0.182) (0.006) (0.003) (0.220)
Special industry machinery, n.e.c. 0.002 0.002 0.023 0.284 0.015 0.011 -0.973 
(0.001) (0.206) (0.208) (0.006) (0.005) (0.261)
General industrial 0.001 0.001 -0.053 0.437 0.015 0.009 -0.905 
(0.001) (0.178) (0.177) (0.006) (0.003) (0.236)
Electrical transmission, distribution -0.002 -0.004 0.429 0.000 0.015 0.005 -0.873 
(0.002) (0.138) (0.157) (0.006) (0.003) (0.238)
ARIMA UC
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TABLE 4.5. INVESTMENT SUPPLY ESTIMATES: EQUIPMENT (CONTINUED) 
 
Notes.  These estimates assume the elasticity of equipment supply is eqp  = 10.  On average, the variance 
of the permanent shock is 0.018 and the variance of the temporary shock is 0.010.  The correlation of the 
two shocks is = -0.927. 
  
(1-)     x,perm  x,trans corr
Trucks, buses, and truck trailers -0.001 -0.002 0.244 0.280 0.020 0.012 -0.925 
(0.003) (0.118) (0.114) (0.008) (0.003) (0.208)
Autos -0.005 -0.006 0.178 0.139 0.022 0.017 -0.999 
(0.003) (0.215) (0.228) (0.008) (0.007) (0.235)
Aircraft 0.002 0.001 -0.691 0.619 0.018 0.010 -0.915 
(0.002) (0.407) (0.426) (0.008) (0.004) (0.141)
Ships and boats 0.002 0.005 0.623 -0.735 0.017 0.013 -0.962 
(0.001) (0.187) (0.174) (0.007) (0.005) (0.256)
Railroad equipment 0.001 0.001 -0.060 0.364 0.022 0.017 -0.999 
(0.002) (0.205) (0.202) (0.009) (0.006) (0.227)
Household furniture -0.001 -0.001 -0.421 0.626 0.014 0.004 -0.788 
(0.001) (0.248) (0.228) (0.006) (0.003) (0.385)
Other furniture 0.000 0.000 -0.315 0.651 0.015 0.010 -0.983 
(0.001) (0.156) (0.137) (0.006) (0.003) (0.151)
Agricultural machinery 0.002 0.001 -0.488 0.762 0.021 0.008 -0.887 
(0.001) (0.154) (0.108) (0.009) (0.005) (0.200)
Construction machinery 0.002 0.002 -0.329 0.601 0.020 0.007 -0.853 
(0.002) (0.174) (0.158) (0.010) (0.005) (0.251)
Mining and oilfield machinery 0.002 0.003 0.346 -0.260 0.017 0.005 -0.964 
(0.002) (0.529) (0.523) (0.007) (0.004) (0.191)
Service industry machinery -0.001 -0.001 -0.325 0.612 0.019 0.004 -0.982 
(0.001) (0.183) (0.165) (0.007) (0.004) (0.246)
Miscellaneous electrical -0.003 -0.003 -0.010 0.267 0.016 0.005 -0.904 
(0.002) (0.228) (0.209) (0.007) (0.004) (0.187)
Household appliances -0.003 -0.002 -0.584 0.682 0.017 0.006 -0.884 
(0.001) (0.293) (0.281) (0.007) (0.004) (0.194)
ARIMA UC
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TABLE 4.6. INVESTMENT SUPPLY ESTIMATES: STRUCTURES 
 
Notes.  These estimates assume the elasticity of structures supply is  str  = 1.25.  On average, the variance 
of the permanent shock is 0.004 and the variance of the temporary shock is 0.002.  The correlation of the 
two shocks in -0.707.
(1-)    x,perm  x,trans corr
Hospitals       -0.003 -0.004 0.206 -0.009 0.003 0.002 -0.987 
(0.003) (0.324) (0.334) (0.000) (0.000) (0.317)
Special care      -0.001 -0.002 0.269 -0.019 0.004 0.001 -0.777 
(0.004) (0.264) (0.273) (0.001) (0.000) (0.323)
Medical buildings      -0.002 -0.003 0.249 0.006 0.003 0.001 -0.853 
(0.004) (0.259) (0.260) (0.001) (0.000) (0.272)
Multimerchandise shopping      0.001 0.002 0.549 -0.304 0.004 0.002 -0.989 
(0.005) (0.245) (0.262) (0.001) (0.001) (0.319)
Food and beverage 0.003 0.004 0.431 -0.337 0.004 0.004 -0.986 
(0.005) (0.683) (0.692) (0.001) (0.003) (0.842)
Warehouses       0.000 0.001 0.580 -0.300 0.004 0.003 -0.997 
(0.005) (0.142) (0.158) (0.001) (0.001) (0.279)
Other commercial      0.001 0.003 0.563 -0.273 0.004 0.002 -0.919 
(0.005) (0.213) (0.250) (0.001) (0.000) (0.268)
Manufacturing 0.000 -0.001 0.653 -0.419 0.005 0.000 -0.938 
(0.006) (0.180) (0.210) (0.001) (0.000) (0.419)
Electric -0.001 0.000 -0.816 0.914 0.004 0.001 -0.322 
(0.004) (0.081) (0.058) (0.001) (0.001) (1.496)
Other power 0.001 0.003 0.559 -0.150 0.007 0.001 -0.919 
(0.007) (0.102) (0.100) (0.001) (0.000) (0.167)
Communication -0.004 -0.007 0.343 -0.268 0.003 0.000 -0.475 
(0.003) (0.752) (0.775) (0.000) (0.000) (1.020)
Petroleum and natural gas 0.007 0.009 0.126 0.062 0.007 0.005 -0.999 
(0.006) (0.279) (0.291) (0.001) (0.001) (0.328)
Mining -0.003 -0.007 0.534 0.261 0.006 0.001 -0.984 
(0.008) (0.092) (0.098) (0.001) (0.000) (0.090)
Religious 0.004 0.005 0.203 -0.278 0.002 0.002 -0.966 
(0.003) (0.783) (0.772) (0.000) (0.002) (0.805)
Educational 0.001 0.008 0.930 -0.911 0.004 0.003 -0.869 
(0.005) (0.231) (0.262) (0.001) (0.036) (12.409)
Railroads 0.000 0.000 -0.499 0.068 0.002 0.001 0.475 
(0.003) (0.101) (0.137) (0.000) (0.001) (0.143)
Farm 0.004 0.007 0.444 -0.225 0.004 0.003 -0.998 
(0.004) (0.274) (0.288) (0.001) (0.001) (0.320)
Multifamily structures -0.003 -0.003 0.171 -0.405 0.001 0.000 0.769 
(0.002) (0.218) (0.213) (0.000) (0.000) (0.245)
UCARIMA
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FIGURE 4.1. INVESTMENT PRICES AND INVESTMENT SUPPLY SHOCKS, GENERAL INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT 
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FIGURE 4.2. INVESTMENT PRICES AND INVESTMENT SUPPLY SHOCKS, MANUFACTURING STRUCTURES 
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APPENDIX 4.A 
ARIMA(1,1,1) REPRESENTATION OF UC-ARMA(1,0) MODEL 
The unobserved components model in equations (2)–(4)  is also known as a UC-ARMA(1,0) 
model, in other words it is the sum of a stochastic trend, a random walk with drift in this case, and 
a stationary ARMA(1,0) process.  In this appendix, we derive the univariate ARIMA 
representation for this model.  Using equation (2) and rearranging terms we can write 
    , , , ,1 1 1m m m m perm m m perm m trans m m transt t t t t tx x x x x x         . (1) 
Iterating backwards one period we obtain 
    , , , ,1 2 1 2 1 2m m m m perm m m perm m trans m m transt t t t t tx x x x x x            . (2) 
Subtracting (2) from (1), applying the difference operator on the left-hand side and rearranging 
yields  
 
   
   
, , , ,
1 1 1 2
, , , ,
1 1 2
m m m perm m perm m perm m perm
t t t t t t
m trans m trans m trans m trans
t t t t
m m
m m
x x x x x x
x x x x
 
 
   
  
       
   
 . (3) 
We substitute in equations (3) and (4) to simplify expression (3) and we obtain  
    1 , , , ,1 1m m m m m mt t m perm m perm m trans m transt tt tx x                 .  (4) 
The composite innovation on the right hand side has non-zero autocorrelations only up to one 
lag, so it admits an MA(1) representation.  This implies that the unobserved components model 
corresponds to a univariate (reduced-form) ARIMA(1,1,1) process 
   1 11m m m m m mt t t tx x e e            (5) 
 
120 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abel, Andrew B. 1982. “Dynamic Effects of Permanent and Temporary Tax Policies in a q Model 
of Investment.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 9(3): 353-373.  
Adda, Jerome, and Russell Cooper. 2000. “Balladurette and Juppette: A Discrete Analysis of 
Scrapping Subsidies.” Journal of Political Economy, 108: 778–806. 
Atalay, Enghin. 2014. “How Important are Sectoral Shocks?” University of Chicago Working 
Paper. 
Auerbach, Alan J., and Kevin A. Hassett. 1991. “Recent U.S. Investment Behavior and the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986: A Disaggregate View.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public 
Policy, 35: 185–215. 
Auerbach, Alan J., and Kevin A. Hassett. 1992. “Tax Policy and Business Fixed Investment in the 
United States.” Journal of Public Economics, 47(2): 141–170. 
Bachmann, Ruediger; Ricardo Caballero, and Eduardo Engel. 2008. “Lumpy Investment in 
Dynamic General Equilibrium.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 12336. 
Bartelsman, Eric J., and Wayne B. Gray. 1996. “The NBER Manufacturing Productivity 
Database,” National Bureau of Economics Research Technical Working Paper 205.  
Barsky, Robert B., F. Thomas Juster, Miles S. Kimball, and Matthew D. Shapiro. 1997. 
“Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the Health 
and Retirement Study.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2): 537–579. 
Bertola, Giuseppe, and Ricardo Caballero. 1990. “Kinked Adjustment Costs and Aggregate 
Dynamics.” In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1990, Volume 5, 237-296. Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press. 
Boehm, Christoph, Aaron Flaaen, and Nitya Pandalai Nayar. 2014. “Input Linkages and the 
Transmission of Shocks: Firm-Level Evidence from the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake.” University of 
Michigan Working Paper. 
Caballero, Ricardo. 1993. “Durable Goods: An Explanation for their Slow Adjustment.” Journal 
of Political Economy 101: 351–384. 
Caballero, Ricardo, and Eduardo Engel. 1993. “Microeconomic Adjustment Hazards and 
Aggregate Dynamics.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(2): 359–383. 
121 
Caballero, Ricardo, and Eduardo Engel. 1999. “Explaining Investment Dynamics in U.S. 
Manufacturing: A Generalized (S,s) Approach.” Econometrica, 67(4): 783–826. 
Caballero, Ricardo J., Eduardo Engel, John C. Haltiwanger, Michael Woodford, and Robert E. 
Hall. 1995. “Plant-Level Adjustment and Aggregate Investment Dynamics.” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 1995(2): 1–54. 
Campbell, John, and Gregory N. Mankiw. 1989. “Consumption, Income and Interest Rates: 
Reinterpreting the Time Series Evidence.” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 4: 185–216. 
Caplin, Andrew, and John V. Leahy. 1991. “State Dependent Pricing and the Dynamics of Money 
and Output.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106: 683–708. 
Caplin, Andrew, and John V. Leahy. 1997. “Aggregation and Optimization with State-Dependent 
Pricing.” Econometrica, 65: 601–627. 
Caplin, Andrew, and John V. Leahy. 2004. “On the Relationship between Representative Agent 
Models and (S,s) Models.” In Productivity, East Asia Seminar on Economics, Volume 13, pp. 351–
376. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 
Caplin, Andrew, and John V. Leahy. 2006. “Equilibrium in a Durable Goods Market with Lumpy 
Adjustment.” Journal of Economic Theory, 128: 187–203. 
Carlstrom, Charles T., and Timothy S. Fuerst. 1997. "Agency costs, net worth, and business 
fluctuations: A computable general equilibrium analysis." The American Economic Review 87(5): 
893–910. 
Chernozhukov, Victor, and Christian Hansen. 2008. "The reduced form: A simple approach to 
inference with weak instruments." Economics Letters 100(1): 68–71. 
Chirinko, Robert S., and Daniel J. Wilson. 2006. “State Investment Tax Incentives: What Are the 
Facts?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2006–49. 
Chow, Gregory C., and An-loh Lin. 1971. “Best linear unbiased interpolation, distribution, and 
extrapolation of time series by related series.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 53: 372–
375. 
Cohen, Darrel, and Jason Cummins. 2006. “A Retrospective Evaluation of the Effects of 
Temporary Partial Expensing.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and 
Economics Discussion Series Working Paper 2006–19. 
Cooper, Russell, and Joao Ejarque. 2003. "Financial frictions and investment: requiem in q." 
Review of Economic Dynamics, 6(4): 710–728. 
Cooper, Russell W., and John C. Haltiwanger. 1993. “The Aggregate Implications of Machine 
Replacement: Theory and Evidence.” American Economic Review 83(3): 360–382.  
122 
Cooper, Russell W., and John C. Haltiwanger. 2006. “On the Nature of Capital Adjustment Costs.” 
Review of Economic Studies, 73: 611–634.  
Cooper, Russell W., John C. Haltiwanger, and Laura Power. 1999. “Machine Replacement and the 
Business Cycle: Lumps and Bumps.” American Economic Review 89: 921–946. 
Cooper, Russell, and Jonathan L. Willis. 2009. “The cost of labor adjustment: Inferences from the 
gap.” Review of Economic Dynamics, 12(4): 632–647. 
Cummins, Jason G., and Giovanni L. Violante. 2002. “Investment-Specific Technical Change in 
the US (1947–2000): Measurement and Macroeconomic Consequences.” Review of Economic 
Dynamics, 5(2): 243–284. 
Doms, Mark, and Timothy Dunne. 1998. “Capital Adjustment Patterns in Manufacturing Plants.” 
Review of Economic Dynamics, 1: 409–429. 
Dotsey, Michael, Robert G. King, and Alexander L. Wolman. 1999. “State Dependent Pricing and 
the General Equilibrium Dynamics of Money and Output.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104: 
655–690. 
Driscoll, John C., and Aart C. Kraay. 1998. “Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with 
Spatially Dependent Panel Data.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 80: 549–560. 
Eberly, Janice. 1994. “Adjustment of Consumers' Durables Stocks: Evidence from Automobile 
Purchases.” Journal of Political Economy 102: 403–436. 
Eberly, Janice, Sergio Rebelo, and Nicolas Vincent. 2008. “Investment and value: A neoclassical 
benchmark.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 13866. 
Edgerton, Jesse. 2010. “Estimating Machinery Supply Elasticities Using Output Price Booms.” 
Federal Reserve Board Working Paper 2011–03. 
Edgerton, Jesse. 2011. “The Effects of Taxation on Business Investment: New Evidence from 
Used Equipment.” Unpublished manuscript. 
Elsby, Michael; Bart Hobijn, and Aysegul Sahin. 2013. “The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share.” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2013(2): 1–63. 
Farber, Henry S. 2005. “Is Tomorrow Another Day? The Labor Supply of New York City Cab 
Drivers.” Journal of Political Economy, 113(1): 46–82. 
Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús, and Juan F. Rubio-Ramírez. 2007. "Estimating macroeconomic 
models: A likelihood approach." The Review of Economic Studies, 74(4): 1059–1087. 
Fisher, Jonas DM. 2006. "The dynamic effects of neutral and investment‐specific technology 
shocks." Journal of political Economy, 114(3): 413–451. 
123 
Floetotto, Max, Nir Jaimovich, and Seth Pruitt. 2009. "Markup Variation and Endogenous 
Fluctuations in the Price of Investment Goods." Stanford University Working Paper. 
Feenstra, Robert C., John Romalis, and Peter K. Schott. 2002. “U.S.Imports, Exports and Tariff 
Data, 1989–2001.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9387. 
Fraumeni, Barbara M. 1997. “The Measurement of Depreciation in the U.S. National Income and 
Product Accounts.” Survey of Current Business, July, 7–23. 
Gali, Jordi. 1999, “Technology, Employment and the Business Cycle: Do Technology Shocks 
Explain Aggregate Fluctuations?” The American Economic Review (89): 249–271. 
Gilchrist, Simon, and Charles P. Himmelberg. 1995. “Evidence on the role of cash flow for 
investment.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 36: 541–572. 
Gomes, J., 2001. “Financing investment.” American Economic Review 91(5): 1263–1285. 
Goolsbee, Austan. 1998. “Investment Tax Incentives, Prices, and the Supply of Capital Goods.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1): 121–148. 
Gordon, Robert J. 1990. The Measurement of Durable Goods Prices. Chicago, Illinois: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Gourieroux, Christian, Alain Monfort, and Eric Renault. 1993. "Indirect inference." Journal of 
applied econometrics 8: S85–S85. 
Gourio, Francois, and Anil Kashyap. 2007. “Investment Spikes: New Facts and a General 
Equilibrium Exploration.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 54: S1–S22. 
Gravelle, Jane H. 1994.  The Economics Effects of Taxing Capital Income. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
Greenwood, Jeremy, Zvi Hercowitz, and Per Krusell. 1997. "Long-run implications of investment-
specific technological change." The American Economic Review, 87(3): 342–362. 
Guerrieri, Luca, Dale Henderson, and Jinill Kim. 2014. "Modeling Investment‐Sector Efficiency 
Shocks: When Does Disaggregation Matter?" International Economic Review, 55(3): 891–917. 
Hall, Robert E., and Dale W. Jorgenson. 1967. “Tax Policy and Investment Behavior.” American 
Economic Review, 57(3): 391–414. 
Hall, Robert E. 1988. “Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption.” Journal of Political Economy 
96(2): 339–357. 
Hamilton, James. 1993. Time Series Analysis. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
124 
Handbook, N.I.P.A. 2014. "Concepts and methods of the US national income and product 
accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis." Posted on the Bureau of Economics Analysis website at 
http://www.bea.gov/methodologies. 
House, Christopher L. 2014. “Fixed Costs and Long-Lived Investments.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Vol. 68, pp. 86–100, November 2014. 
House, Christopher L., and Matthew Shapiro. 2008. “Temporary Investment Tax Incentives: 
Theory with Evidence from Bonus Depreciation.” American Economic Review, 93(3): 737–768. 
Hulten, Charles R. "Growth Accounting When Technical Change Is Embodied in Capital." 1992. 
American Economic Review, 82(4): 964–80. 
Hulten, Charles R., and Frank C Wykoff. 1981a. “The Estimation of Economic Depreciation Using 
Vintage Asset Prices: An Application of the Box-Cox Power Transformation.” Journal of 
Econometrics, 15(3): 367–396. 
Hulten, Charles R., and Frank C Wykoff. 1981b. “The Measurement of Economic Depreciation.” 
In Depreciation, Inflation, and the Taxation of Income from Capital, pp. 81–125.  Washington, 
D.C: Urban Institute Press. 
Jorgenson, Dale W. 1963. “Capital Theory and Investment Behavior.” American Economic Review 
Papers and Proceedings, 53(2): 247–259. 
Jorgenson, Dale W., and Kun-Young Yun. 1990. “Tax Reform and U.S. Economic Growth.” 
Journal of Political Economy, 98(5): S151–S193. 
Jorgenson, Dale W., and Kun-Young Yun. 1991. Tax Reform and the Cost of Capital. Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press. 
Hulten, Charles R. "Growth Accounting When Technical Change Is Embodied in Capital." 1992. 
American Economic Review, 82(4): 964–80. 
Justiniano, Alejandro, Giorgio E. Primiceri, and Andrea Tambalotti. 2011. "Investment Shocks 
and the Relative Price of Investment." Review of Economic Dynamics 14(1): 102–121. 
Khan, Aubhik, and Julia Thomas. 2003. “Nonconvex Factor Adjustments in Equilibrium Business 
Cycle Models: Do Nonlinearities Matter?” Journal of Monetary Economics, 50: 331–360. 
Khan, Aubhik, and Julia Thomas. 2007. “Idiosyncratic Shocks and the Role of Nonconvexities in 
Plant and Aggregate Investment Dynamics.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper 12845. 
Kimball, Miles, and Matthew D. Shapiro. 2008. “Labor Supply: Are Income and Substitution 
Effects Both Large or Both Small?” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 
14208. 
125 
King, Robert G., and Thomas, Julia. 2006. “Partial Adjustment without Apology.” International 
Economic Review, 47(3): 779–809. 
Liu, Zheng, Daniel F. Waggoner, and Tao Zha. 2009. “Sources of the Great Moderation: Shocks, 
Friction, or Monetary Policy?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2009–01. 
Mian, Atif, and Amir Sufi. 2012. “The Effects of Fiscal Stimulus: Evidence from the 2009 ‘Cash 
for Clunkers’ Program.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127 (3): 1107–1142. 
Millar, Jonathan N. 2005. “Gestation Lags and the Relationship between Investment and Q in 
Regressions.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), Finance and Economics 
Discussion Series 2005–28. 
Morley, James C., Charles R Nelson, and Eric Zivot. 2003. “Why are the Beveridge-Nelson and 
Unobserved-Components Decompositions of GDP so Different?” The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 85(2): 235–243. 
Mussa, Michael L. 1977. “External and Internal Adjustment Costs and the Theory of Aggregate 
and Firm Investment.” Economica, 44: 163–178. 
Nagakura, Daisuke. 2011. "How Are Shocks to Trend and Cycle Correlated? A Simple 
Methodology for Unidentified Unobserved Components Models."  Bank of Japan Discussion 
Paper 2008-E-24. 
Ng, Serena, and Pierre Perron. 1995. “Unit Root Tests in ARMA Models with Data-Dependent 
Methods for the Selection of the Truncation Lag.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 
90(429): 268–281. 
Papanikolaou, Dimitris. 2011. "Investment Shocks and Asset Prices." Journal of Political 
Economy, 119(4): 639–685. 
Ramey, Valerie A., and Matthew D. Shapiro. 1998. “Costly Capital Reallocation and the Effects 
of Government Spending.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 48: 145–194. 
Ramey, Valerie A., and Matthew D. Shapiro. 2001. “Displaced Capital: A Study of Aerospace 
Plant Closings.”  Journal of Political Economy, 109: 958–992. 
Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. 2009. “A Narrative Analysis of Postwar Tax Changes.” 
Online appendix to Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. 2010. "The Macroeconomic Effects 
of Tax Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks." American Economic 
Review, 100(3), 763-801.  Posted on the American Economic Review website. 
Sallee, James M. 2011. “The Surprising Incidence of Tax Credits for the Toyota Prius.” American 
Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 3(2): 189–219. 
Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie, and Martin Uribe. 2012. “What’s News in Business Cycles?” 
Econometrica, 80: 2733-2764. 
126 
Shapiro, Matthew D. 1986a. "Capital utilization and capital accumulation: Theory and evidence." 
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 1(3): 211–234. 
Shapiro, Matthew D. 1986b. “The Dynamic Demand for Capital and Labor.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 101: 513–542. 
Solow, Robert M. "Investment and technical progress." 1960. Mathematical methods in the social 
sciences, 1: 48–93. 
Summers, Lawrence H. 1981. “Taxation and Corporate Investment: a q-Theory Approach.” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1981(1): 67–127. 
Thomas, Julia. 2002. “Is Lumpy Investment Relevant for the Business Cycle?” Journal of Political 
Economy, 110: 508–534. 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 1993. Fixed Reproducible 
Tangible Wealth in the United States: 1925–1989. Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing 
Office. 
Veracierto, Marcelo. L. 2002. “Plant-Level Irreversible Investment and Equilibrium Business 
Cycles.” American Economic Review, 92: 181–197. 
Whelan, Karl. 1999. “Tax incentives, material inputs, and the supply curve for capital equipment.” 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors Working Paper 99-21. 
Zwick, Eric, and James Mahon. 2014. “Do Financial Frictions Amplify Fiscal Policy? Evidence 
from Business Investment Stimulus.” Harvard University Working Paper. 
